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FAIR USE AND FAIRNESS ON CAMPUS t
Deborah Gerhardt * and Madelyn Wessel
Copyright protection was meant to promote learning; yet
copyright law too often thwarts this very purpose. Fair use is the
primary means to restore the balance between the copyright
regime's enablement of proprietary control and the public good of
access. It is a right that must be exercised if it is not to be lost.
This article demonstrates why fair use is so critical to higher
education, and seeks to clarify legal ambiguities of the law offair
use in order to better align this doctrine with critical educational
goals. To illustrate the importance of the issue, we present data
demonstrating the lack of equality in campus access to and use of
information. For educational institutions with limited resources,
fair use is of crucial importance, enabling faculty and students to
access reasonable amounts of unlicensed content for scholarly and
educational purposes. For individual scholars with limited access
to copyright counsel or institutional subsidies for permissions and
fees, fair use is also of crucial importance, enabling dissemination
and publication of research. Unequal resources makes the lack of
clarity and reluctance to use and defend fair use within the
academy especially problematic. Fair use muscles may atrophy
t The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not express
institutional views or official university policy of our respective institutions. An
earlier version of this work was presented under the Title "Flexing Fair Use
Muscles: Electronic Course Reserves, the Use of Art, Images and Thumbnails
in Teaching and Learning, Fair Use for Scholars, and Finding the Public Domain
Clock" at the National Association of College and University Attorneys
("NACUA") meeting on November 7-9, 2007, in Washington, D.C. The
authors are most grateful to Cassondra C. Anderson and Rachel Blunk for
providing excellent research assistance. The authors also wish to thank Lynda
S. White, Associate Director, Management Information Services, University of
Virginia Library, for her help in obtaining and organizing the Association of
Research Libraries ("ARL") statistical materials.
Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
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and flex, but the latter mode of action is far more empowering to
the academic mission and far better aligned with the Founders'
understanding that copyright is intrinsically entwined with public
access.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power to protect copyright law was written into the U.S.
Constitution in order to stimulate, rather than limit, creative
expression.' The nation's Founders believed that protecting
copyrights would benefit society by stimulating greater public
access to more work in order to encourage learning.' The Supreme
Court has explained that the Copyright Clause "motivate[s] the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and ... allow[s] the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired."' Although our understanding of this particular
constitutional purpose is often eclipsed by other policies, it remains
an important consideration that merits more attention.
An examination of the history of U.S. copyright legislation
reveals an expansion of copyright owner rights, a diminution of
their responsibilities, and, as a result, a shrinking public domain.4
More and more works have been given copyright protection, often
to address new forms of expression made possible by new
' Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (quoting
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)) ("The immediate effect of
our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. 'The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' ").
2 See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
3 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
4 See Laura N. Gasaway, A Defense of the Public Domain: A Scholarly Essay,
101 L. LIBR. J. 451, 462 (2009) ("The quick answer to whether the public
domain is shrinking is yes."); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING
THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 241 (2008); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:
How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DowN CULTURE
AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 24-25, 133-38 (2004).
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technology.' Formalities once required to get the big bundle of
copyrights have been discarded.' Copyright terms are now longer.'
The application of copyright laws to new technologies and digital
environments has become extraordinarily complex. The resulting
legal uncertainties endanger the core values of public and
educational access, scholarship, and creativity that copyright laws
were meant to protect.
While the relationship between copyright and the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has often been explored,' this
5 In 1790 Congress only protected maps, charts, and books. See I Stat. 124 § 4
(1790). The Copyright Act now protects a wide array of content including dance
and musical scores, film, audio and video, recordings, architectural works, and
software. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03 (2009) (enumerating many
diverse media protected by copyright law).
6 Before the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, claimants were required to
adhere to a number of formalities such as depositing the work in the Copyright
Office and affixing notice on published works in order to receive copyright
protection. 35 Stat. 1075, § 19 (1909). These formalities are no longer required
in order to secure copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (2006).
7 Upon passage of the Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA") in 1998,
copyright protection terms were expanded by twenty years so that works
copyrighted before 1978 that were still under copyright received protection for
95 years from the date the copyright was originally secured. CTEA, Pub. L.
105-298, § 102(b)-(d), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302, 304). For works created on or after January 1, 1978, the CTEA
provided a term of copyright protection enduring for the life of the author plus
70 years. Id. For works of joint authorship, protection was expanded to last for
the life of the last living author plus 70 years, and for anonymous works, works
made for hire, or pseudonymous works, protection lasts for 95 years from the
year the work was first published or 120 years from the creation of the work,
whichever ends first. Id; see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003)
(discussing the CTEA and prior extensions to the term of copyrights).
8 See, e.g., DAVID L. LANG & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT (2009) (exploring
how observance of absolute first amendment values would change copyright
law); William McGinty, First Amendment Rights to Protected Expression:
What Are the Traditional Contours of Copyright Law?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1099 (2008) (asserting that changes to copyright law should be analyzed to
determine whether they are unconstitutional under the First Amendment);
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537 (2004-2005)
(exploring the incompatibility of the First Amendment value of copying with
copyright law and finding that "[a]s fair use has grown in doctrinal importance
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article notes copyright's intersection with values anchored in other
parts of the Constitution, namely the educational purpose of the
Copyright Clause9 itself and provisions dealing with equal
protection. Access to copyrighted content in education is not
simply a matter of free speech; it is also a question of social
justice.
Wealthier institutions have many advantages. They can
purchase and access greater amounts of content (especially in the
sciences) and hire licensing specialists and copyright counsel to
maximize their uses of these resources. They are also able to
provide more monetary and legal resources to faculty whose
research and publication projects hit the rocky waters of
permissions and fees. Because access to information is a critical
component of the academic experience, copyright control and
increasing costs for digital materials have the potential to
exacerbate inequalities in our nation's schools.
In this environment, it is more important than ever to
understand the copyright exemptions that do not require
permission or fees before content may be used for purposes central
to higher education. Of these, the most critical mechanism, the
as a means to harmonize copyright with the First Amendment, it has also,
paradoxically, begun to shrink, excluding activities such as copying for research
or educational purposes"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002-2003) (enumerating
conflicts between copyright law and the First Amendment and explaining which
copyright provisions should yield to a "freedom of imagination"); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REv. 1, 81-85 (2001-2002) (arguing that the First Amendment should
be utilized to "buttress" the fair use privilege); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a
Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright has in Common with Anti-
Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications
Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2000-2001) (demonstrating "that the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense do not eliminate free speech
problems; if anything, they make copyright seem even less supportable, a
confusing body of law likely to deter speakers from speech that might
potentially be thought to infringe"); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright,
and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987) (discussing how fair use creates a
conflict between the Copyright and First Amendment Clauses of the
Constitution).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
[VOL. 11: 461464
Fair Use on Campus
principle of fair use, provides a means of ameliorating inequalities
in access to and use of information. Fair use accomplishes this
goal by safeguarding many reasonable uses of content for teaching,
research, and scholarship without requiring the payment of fees."o
Surely if any societal institution has a moral and philosophical
imperative to understand and exercise rights to fair use, it should
be higher education. Yet many factors contribute to a fear of fair
use and reluctance to exercise these rights within the academy.
In Part II, we explore the landscape that showed us the
importance of thinking about access to information as a question of
social justice. We provide summary statistics that demonstrate the
inequality in access to content first among relatively resource rich
research institutions and then across a broader spectrum of colleges
and universities. Against this backdrop, we consider how the
dramatic inequalities in online resources throughout academia
should affect copyright jurisprudence and the understanding and
application of fair use in a digital age.
Application of the fair use standard requires thought, judgment,
and the time to keep a watchful eye over the ever-changing
landscape of copyright precedent. In Part III, we argue that the
lack of clarity (real and perceived) in copyright law provides
exceptional challenges, especially for institutions without access to
copyright counsel. When answers are not clear and potential
liability is thought to be significant, saying "no" to a proposed use
is often considered the safest course. The legal risks may be
perceived as especially threatening at institutions with limited
resources. In seeking clarity and avoiding risk, the temptation can
be strong to act as if fair use does not exist and to shift campus
copyright policy to a safe zone based on blanket licenses, fees, and
permissions, even when law would not require these actions. We
present reasons to resist that temptation, striving to clarify recent
changes in fair use jurisprudence that support practices which
foster equity in access to information.
Part IV reexamines well-established fair use myths in light of
recent legal authority. Copyright fair use is dynamic. As federal
laws have expanded authors' and publishers' copyrights, the courts
'
0 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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have recognized a parallel expansion in the doctrine of fair use.
Although the boundaries of fair use continue to be unclear in many
contexts, year by year, case law tends to contribute to clarity, often
adding to the list of uses that a court would consider to be fair.
Given the evolution of fair use jurisprudence, we must take the
time to reflect on our assumptions about fair use as new authority
emerges.
Part V illustrates the importance of understanding fair use
through a practical application in the context of academic
scholarship. Several recent incidents involving scholarly
publications are recounted to demonstrate the difference that the
assertion and defense of fair use can make." Next, we demonstrate
that in the context of scholarly writing, fair use will generally favor
the reproduction of content that is necessary to support critical
commentary. Finally, we conclude that the fair use right must
remain a strong right on campus unless we want fear of copyright
to interfere with the educational mission and exacerbate
inequalities that affect both students and scholars.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXING FAIR USE MUSCLES ON
CAMPUS
New technologies have provided unprecedented means to
distribute, research, use, and access content in the classroom.
Today, most scholars expect to have electronic access to current
research journals. Digital content provides many important
advantages in that it occupies less physical space, provides access
to multiple users simultaneously, and allows for searchability. Yet
it also creates new costs, limitations, and complications under
copyright law regarding who may access the content and how it
may be used.
The significant differences in managing the use of hard and
electronic copies present many difficult copyright issues. Books
and journals printed on paper can be accessed, read, and assigned
(perhaps by placing the text on a reserve shelf), as long as the copy
remains in the library's collection, without additional
compensation transferred to the copyright owner. The first sale
"See infra Part V.A.
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doctrine provides a wide scope of protection that allows multiple
users to read a printed book.12 Once a print text is purchased, a
library does not face recurring costs for access afforded its patrons.
Additionally, libraries generally could develop consistent
principled policies under the provisions of the Copyright Act
relevant to the use and sharing of books and journals which reside
in their collections as hard copies (including with other libraries
through interlibrary loan provisions). In contrast, each electronic
collection is governed by a different license agreement with
different terms of use. 3
In addition, access to current online journals is generally
purchased annually. 4 As Ann Bartow astutely observes, "[m]ost
electronic publications are licensed rather than sold under terms
and conditions that may not be readily negotiable. It is not at all
clear that digitalization enhances access, and it may instead be true
that it decreases the scope of collections over time."" Many would
describe the digital licensing relationship as more like a rental than
a purchase in the sense that libraries must maintain a licensing
relationship with the journal publisher to keep online access for the
campus community. 6 Even though many astute research libraries
negotiate provisions ensuring some archival rights to the annual
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
'3 Most large journal publishers insist on confidentiality of library licenses,
making comparison of pricing and contract terms very difficult to assess except
in cases of public institutions subject to state open records laws. Ellen Finnie
Duranceau, License Compliance, 26 SERIALS REV. 53, 55 (2000).
14 Many libraries also license online journals in multi-year packages with
"protected" price increases annually of, for example, 6%. Payment is often due
on an annual basis in such multi-year deals. Agreement between University of
Virginia and Elsevier B.V. (Nov. 26, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
1 Ann Bartow, Some Peer-to-Peer, Democratically, and Voluntarily-
Produced Thoughts, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 449, 464-65 (2006-
2007). When a subscription expires or is canceled, the back issues of a
periodical may be unavailable. Id. at 465.
16 Id.; Bartow also notes that publisher bankruptcies or even obsolete
technology formats pose a threat to the library access and the scholarly record.
See also Gasaway, supra note 4, at 468 ("As licenses, as opposed to sales,
become more common for copyrighted works, pay-for-use may become the
norm. Unfortunately, license terms trump fair use.").
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journal contents purchased each year," few have the technological
capability to host the electronic content in the journals
independently. The publishers justify on-going access fees
because their servers deliver content to the campus community,
even though hard copies of the underlying annual journals
themselves have been purchased by the library in question. It is
not uncommon for libraries to purchase "backfiles" of journals that
may partially include content for which the library also had a
regular annual subscription.'" Some publisher agreements define
"users" narrowly so that not all who have access to a library may
have access to the particular content.19 For the legal databases,
"LEXIS/NEXIS [sic] and WESTLAW [sic], use under the law
library's contract is restricted only to that school's enrolled
students, faculty and staff."2 0 These licenses do not permit other
" For example, the University of Virginia's agreement with publishing giant
Elsevier provides:
Upon termination of all of the Subscriber's annual subscriptions on
ScienceDirect online, the Subscriber may, at its option, (1) acquire,
load and technically format on a server that enables access and use by
Authorized Users an electronic copy of all or part of its Subscribed
Titles for the publication years paid for cost at a rate of $1,250 per tape
(adjusted annually for inflation and cost increases) and/or (2) continue
to access such Subscribed Titles online for an annual access fee based
on the number of full-text articles downloaded from such titles during
the prior twelve (12) months at a rate of $0.081 per download (adjusted
annually for inflation and cost increases), in accordance with the usage
provisions of this Agreement, which provisions shall survive the
termination of the Agreement.
Agreement between University of Virginia and Elsevier B.V. (Nov. 26,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
18 See, e.g., ScienceDirect, Journal Backfiles, http://info.sciencedirect.com/
content/backfiles/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology) ("Elsevier Backfiles on ScienceDirect is a
historical archive of journals from 1994 and older, many going back to Volume
1, Issue 1."); Springer Online Journal Archives, http://www.springer.com/
librarians?SGWID=0-l 17-6-126299-0 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) ("Springer has digitized nearly
1000 journals chronicled from Volume 1, Issue I in the Springer Online Journal
Archives.").
'9 See Laura N. Gasaway, Copyright Ownership & The Impact on Academic
Libraries, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. POL'Y 277, 299 (2003).
20 Id. at 300.
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patrons of a public institution, such as local lawyers or citizens
trying to understand the law, to access these tools. Some pricing
models based on pay-per-use make unaffordable the very access
that the digital environment was supposed to facilitate.2,
Therefore, in the digital context, multiple uses can increase the
price of the single electronic copy.
The ubiquitous availability and online searchability of digital
content come at a significant cost. Supplying universities with the
publications that document cutting-edge research has become a
lucrative business.22  The prices of scholarly publications,
especially in the sciences, are increasing faster than library
budgets. 23  Due to economic realities, every year libraries are
forced to make tough choices regarding where to shrink their
collections. Further, due to space limitations, decreasing budgets,
and the preferences of the research community, universities often
choose to purchase new material only in digital format.24
Libraries with sufficient resources may hire people to negotiate
favorable terms such as broad definitions of users and permission
21 See Bartow, supra note 15, at 464 ("Budgetary demands preclude infinite
access to pay per view resources.").
22 Lee C. Van Orsdel & Kathleen Born, Periodicals Price Survey 2007:
Serial Wars, 132 LIBR. J. 43, 43 (2007) ("Forecasts from commercial publishers
touting collapse and disaster seemed oddly out of sync with the profits they
enjoyed-around 25 percent on average.").
23 Id. at 48 ("In 2007, academic libraries saw overall journal price increases
just under eight percent for the second year in a row. U.S. titles rose nine percent
on average; non-U.S., 7.3 percent."). In contrast, higher education budgets are
static or falling. See Eric Kelderman, More Cuts for Colleges Are Likely Even
After States Pass Budgets, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 27, 2009, available
at http://chronicle.com/article/Further-State-Budget-Cuts-Loom/47448/. The
five-year consortial agreement with Elsevier of the seven public Virginia
graduate institutions (University of Virginia ("UVA"), Virginia Commonwealth
University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University ("Virginia
Tech"), George Mason University, The College of William and Mary, James
Madison University, and Old Dominion University) provides for approximately
six percent annual increases over five years, for a total expenditure of about
forty million dollars. Agreement between University of Virginia and Elsevier
B.V. (Nov. 26, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
24 See, e.g., Van Orsdel & Born, supra note 22.
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to place the purchased content on electronic reserve or to engage in
other fair uses. Negotiations can result in more favorable terms
only for the institution seeking them.2 5 Generally, only institutions
with the resources and courage to ask for greater access will get
such accommodations. Many remain saddled with more restrictive
license agreements. Similarly, academic libraries that are able to
form consortial licensing arrangements often receive better pricing
and terms than institutions negotiating alone.26
Clout can come with size. In 2007, The Massachusetts
Institute of Technology ("MIT") terminated its subscription to the
Society for Automotive Engineers ("SAE") Digital Library
25 See Gasaway, supra note 19, at 299.
26 However, even consortial clout is often insufficient to ward off price
increases. On January 4, 2010, the Committee on Institutional Cooperation
("CIC") (University of Chicago, University of Illinois, Indiana University,
University of Iowa, University of Michigan, Michigan State University,
University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, Ohio State University,
Pennsylvania State University, Purdue University, and University of Wisconsin-
Madison) issued an announcement expressing their opposition to Nature
Publishing Group's new site-license pricing for Scientific American and their
intent to cut subscriptions:
NPG recently took control of this title from another publisher,
proceeding to raise the library print subscription price almost seven-
fold, and the electronic site-license price at 10 times the cost of a print
subscription. The Nature publishing company has a history of
aggressive pricing practices for its specialized scholarly journals, and is
apparently intent on applying these practices to the more general
interest content it acquires . . . .
While the pricing of a single magazine or journal like Scientific
American does not seriously imperil the bottom line of larger libraries,
the pattern of commercial publishers buying up titles-scholarly or
popular-with the intention of raising prices out of proportion to the
costs of production and distribution, is indeed a serious threat to
libraries and readers. The CIC libraries will work with our students and
faculty to resist these predatory business practices that undermine our
shared commitment to the broadest possible dissemination of
knowledge.
Library Directors Respond to Pricing Proposal for Scientific American,
COMMITTEE ON INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION, Jan. 4, 2010, http://www.cic.net
/home/NewsAndPubs/News/10-01 
-04/LibraryDirectorsRespond to Pricing
Proposal forScientific American.aspx (on file with the North Carolina Journal
of Law & Technology).
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because the society insisted on a "drastic" price increase with a
new digital rights management regime that would have
significantly restricted common scholarly uses such as
downloading and emailing documents to colleagues.27 MIT faculty
and librarians joined forces to convince the SAE board to drop the
proposed changes.28 MIT viewed this issue as sufficiently
significant to devote substantial resources to this effort.29 This
dispute is unusual in that MIT succeeded in convincing the SAE
board to drop Digital Rights Management ("DRM") from its
collection, resulting in broader access to all subscribers.30
The differences in the level of access are dwarfed by a factor
that has a much greater impact-the extent to which a university
can afford to purchase access to content at all. No academic
institution can afford to purchase everything it would like to
include in its collections. Due to increasing costs and a wide
disparity in available resources, wealthy universities are able to
spend a much smaller fraction of their budget purchasing much
more content than institutions with fewer resources. The following
charts illustrate the disparity that exists even among the most
resource rich institutions. The data in these charts was collected by
and is used with the permission of the Association of Research
Libraries ("ARL")."' The ARL member libraries "are research
libraries distinguished by the breadth and quality of their
collections and services. Each member also makes distinctive
contributions to the aggregation of research resources and services
27 See, After DRM Standoff MIT Libraries and SAE Reach Accord, 133 LIBR.
J. 18, 18 (2008), available at http://www/libraryjournal.com/info/
CA6543732.html#news2 ("SAE announced it intended to require use of a plug-
in, called FileOpen, to access content from the SAE Digital Library, as well as
instituting download limits and a 'drastic' increase in prices, noted MIT librarian
Tracy Gabridge. MIT librarians argued that the restrictions also included curbed




31 For ARL statistics, see http://www.arl.org/stats/annualsurveys/arlstats
/index.shtml (last visited on Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
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in North America."3 2 The criteria for membership include:
sustained institutional commitment to the library over time (as
evidenced by the nature and extent of resources allocated) and
continuing investment that will support:
* distinctive research-oriented collections and resources of
national significance in a variety of media;
* services to the scholarly community, including the availability of
electronic resources;
* participation in national and/or international library-related
programs;
* the creation of bibliographic records and their availability on one
of the major bibliographic networks;
* the use made of the collections and services by faculty, students,
and visiting scholars;
* the preservation of research resources;
* the leadership and external contributions of the staff to the
profession [and]
* the effective and innovative use of technology.3 3
The vast majority of U.S. libraries do not qualify for membership
in ARL. Of the thousands of colleges and universities in North
America, only 124 were ARL members in 2009.34 Therefore, the
sample data set forth below reflects disparities among the most
elite research institutions in the nation. Table I illustrates the
32 Principles of Membership in the Association of Research Libraries,
http://www.arl.org/arl/membership/qualprin.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2010)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
33 id.
34 Staff Information Entry for Charles B. Lowry, Executive Director of ARL,
http://www.arl.org/arl/staff/lowry-print.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). The Carnegie
Classification of Institutions of Higher Education 2000 Report (updated Oct. 29,
2004), lists 3,941 institutions of higher education in the U.S. Of these, 261 are
Doctoral/Research Institutions ("Carnegie Code D"); 611 are Master's Colleges
and Universities ("Carnegie Code M"); 606 are Baccalaureate Colleges
("Carnegie Code B"); 1,669 are Associate's Colleges ("Carnegie Code A"); 766
are Specialized Institutions, and twenty-eight are Tribal Colleges and
Universities. THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING,
THE CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 14
(2001), available at http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/downloads
/2000_edition data_printable.pdf.
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number of serial subscriptions reportedly available" at six ARL
libraries."
Table I documents significant disparities in access to content, even
among these relatively resource rich ARL member institutions.
Howard University provides access to less than half the number of
subscriptions available at Kent State University, the University of
35 "Available" serials include those purchased directly by the institution as
well as serials made available through other mechanisms such as a statewide
purchasing plans and "free" subscriptions offered as a part of a package with
other acquisitions.
36 For ARL Data, see http://www.arl.org/stats/annualsurveys/arlstats/mrstat
.shtml. These statistics reflect the number of serials each institution reports in
its documentation to ARL and are not independently verified. Each school uses
different personnel and potentially different methods to report the number of
serials. Therefore, the numbers reported above should be viewed as no more
than rough estimates. In an effort to continually increase the reliability of such
data, ARL continues to adapt its reporting standards.
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North Carolina at Chapel Hill ("UNC"), or the University of
Texas. A student at Harvard will have access to more than four
times the number of serials compared to a student at Howard.
Access to journals obviously does not define the complete
academic experience. Nevertheless, this data does reflect basic
differences in the immediate availability of content at different
universities.
Table II illustrates the percentage of the library budgets that are
dedicated to purchasing journal subscriptions."
Table II demonstrates that university libraries with fewer resources
spend a much greater percentage of their overall budget purchasing
serials. No formula indicates the percentage of a library's budget
that will be spent on serials. Instead, the data reflects that ARL
libraries appear to purchase as much content as they can justify
within their budgets. Howard University Library spends 33% of
its budget to buy its journal subscriptions. Although Harvard is
able to afford to spend more than six times the amount that
37 See supra note 36.
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Howard spends, it uses only 8% of its library budget to do so. For
its investment, Howard students, faculty, and staff obtained access
to 26,687 serials, whereas the Harvard community has access to
110,628 serials."
Table III shows how the sampled library serial expenditures
changed between 2006 and 2008." It reveals a very narrow span
of time; even so, it suggests that the inequalities illustrated above
may widen. Between 2006 and 2008, Howard increased its
spending on serials from 30% of its total budget to 33%.40
Harvard, in contrast, was able to decrease the amount of its
spending on serials from 9% to 8% of its total budget.4' Even in
challenging economic times, libraries with less may strive to
provide more, while the richer institutions may afford to trim their
budgets and still provide access to a vast array of scholarly content.
Ta*al epndn III - erinag sf oas Percets Ioadxen.tue
3 %- - - -T ab e- -
27%:27:
25 - ~ 22 23 . 2 23
21% ~
Wha des t ea inprctialtems oronecapu
comnt2ohveoln0cesthogt irryt atymr
WhSesa doe 36. a npacia em froecmu
40 See Table Ill. UVA, UNC, and the University of Texas also increased their
serials spending as a percentage of total budgets. Id.
41' See Table III.
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substantial and diverse scholarly resources than another? At a
most basic level, it means that one community has the ability to
research, access, use, and read vastly greater amounts of
information. It means that students and faculty with access to
fewer subscriptions will likely pay more money for access to
journal articles, course packs, individual subscriptions, images,
data sets, and other materials. Considering the magnitude of the
differences among even the most affluent research libraries in the
United States, the inequalities on a national scale are significant
indeed.42
The Association of College and Research Libraries ("ACRL")
collects and publishes similar data from its vastly larger group of
members.43 The tables that follow document vast disparities in
library spending and holdings among the 3007 ACRL member
institutions responding to the survey." These tables are organized
42 Of the numerous colleges and universities in the Commonwealth of
Virginia, only UVA and Virginia Tech are included in the ARL ranks. Between
those two institutions, UVA is ranked 24th overall in the ARL based on ARL's
"investment index." Virginia Tech is ranked 105th. In North Carolina, only
UNC, North Carolina State University, and Duke University make the ARL list.
ARL Statistics 2007-08, http://www.arl.org/stats/annualsurveys/arlstats/arlstats
08.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
43 "ACRL, the largest division of the American Library Association, is a
national organization of academic and research libraries and librarians with
more than 12,000 members representing librarians working with all types of
academic libraries--community and junior college, college, and university-as
well as comprehensive and specialized research libraries and their professional
staffs." Association of College and Research Libraries Membership Page,
http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/acrl/about/membership/index.cfm (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
44 See Association of College & Research Libraries, 2008 Statistical
Summaries, http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/acrl/publications/trends/2008/
index.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology). The ACRL distributes this data freely on its website and
permits the use of it subject to the following statement:
© Copyright 1997-2009 American Library Association. The American
Library Association is providing information and services on the web
in furtherance of its non-profit and tax-exempt status. Permission to
use, copy and distribute documents delivered from this web site and
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along the Carnegie classifications.45 We have selected data
showing both the high and median spending or resource
availabilities to document not only the significant differences
between institutions based on institutional type (e.g., associate's
degree granting institutions versus master's/doctoral), but also
within each category.
ACRL Library Data Tables 2007-Summary Data:
Expenditures"
Total Library Expenditures (Chart I)
Carnegie Code Carnegie Code Carnegie Code Carnegie Code
A B M D
High $5,384,300 $9,863,971 $68,327,972 $110,849,458
Median $394,234 $465,151 $1,148,032 $4,944,183
related graphics is hereby granted for private, non-commercial and
education purposes only, provided that the above copyright notice
appears with the following notice: this document may be reprinted and
distributed for non-commercial and education purposes only, and not
for resale. No resale use may be made of material on this web site at
any time. All other rights reserved.
American Library Association Web Copyright Statement and Release,
http://www.ala.org/ala/footer/copyright.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
45 "Carnegie Code A" refers to institutions granting Associates of Arts
degrees. "Carnegie Code B" refers to institutions granting Bachelors of Arts.
"Carnegie Code M" refers to Master of Arts and professional degree granting
institutions. "Carnegie Code D" refers to doctoral degree granting institutions.
See THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, supra note
34.
46 See supra note 44.
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Table IV allows comparison of the total expenditures made by
libraries in the four Carnegie classifications.47 This data group
makes clear the wide disparities in total library spending both
within each Carnegie classification and from classification to
classification. In Carnegie Code D (doctoral), for example, the
high expenditure noted is more than $110,000,000, but the median
even for this large university category, is under $5,000,000, or less
than 5% of the resources available at the top. In comparing
doctoral level institutions with associate's or bachelor's degree
granting institutions (Codes A and B), one sees that even the top
purchasers have only 5% and 10%, respectively, of the resources
available to the richest doctoral institutions.
47 See supra note 44.
478 [VOL. 11: 461
Fair Use on Campus
The volumes available in a research library constitute one essential
resource to students and faculty on that campus. Table V again
shows dramatic differences within each Carnegie classification
group and from group to group.4 9 As would be anticipated,
doctoral institutions have vastly greater numbers of books
available, with a high of sixteen million volumes at one institution.
48 See supra note 44.
49 See supra note 44.
ACRL Library Data Tables 2007-Summary Data: Collections 48
Volumes in Library (Chart II)
Carnegie Carnegie Carnegie Carnegie
Code A Code B Code M Code D
High 243,982 2,585,463 10,719,219 15,965,675
Median 50,204 122,510 195,965 808,954
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However, within this classification, the median drops to well under
one million volumes. The median at associate's degree granting
institutions is 50,204 volumes; at bachelor's degree granting
institutions is 122,510 volumes; and at master's degree granting
institutions is 195,965 volumes.
ACRL Library Data Tables 2007-Summary Data: Collections50
Serials Purchased (Chart Ill)
Carnegie Code Carnegie Code Carnegie Code Carnegie Code
A B M D
High 37,924 63,794 73,009 94,277
Median 215 1 626 1,328 6,078
50 See supra note 44.
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Table VI provides additional information across a broader
range of institutions than those previously examined in the context
of the ARL sample institutions in Tables I-III. ' Whereas
significant differences were noted among the elite ARC
institutions, this ACRL data allows a look at a much broader
spectrum. For Carnegie Code D doctoral institutions (institutions
like those potentially eligible for membership in ARL), the median
number of serials purchased is 6,078. This compares with a high
in this data set of 94,277 serials.
These differences in available content, especially online
journals that can be accessed through a link on a course website or
electronic reserves, seem to be an especially significant factor
illuminating inequalities. This data underscores the importance of
preserving fair use as a basis for delivering "multiple copies for
classroom use"5 2 to students through course reserves, especially for
institutions with fewer resources. An institution with ninety or a
hundred thousand individual journal subscriptions is unlikely to
need to worry as much about fair use, as its library already offers
almost all of the current scholarly research and commentary the
community might need through online linking. A college or
university library with 215 (Carnegie Code A median), 626
(Carnegie Code B median), 1,328 (Carnegie Code M median), or
even 6,078 (Carnegie Code D median) subscriptions is a library
that will need to rely thoughtfully on fair use unless it is able to
afford constant additional purchases to allow its students to engage
with current scholarship and research for even the limited context
of classroom learning.53
The vast discrepancies in educational resources between rich
and lower-wealth educational institutions cannot be equalized by
any easy measure, let alone the single principle of fair use. We do
not suggest that institutions with smaller collections of books or
limited numbers of journals are entitled to take and copy whatever
their faculty might want to deliver to students without appropriate
s' See supra note 44.
52 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
5 Some of these inequalities may be ameliorated by other library practices, such
as interlibrary loans. However, such access is not immediate and is only
available if the source may be located within the library's network.
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compensation to copyright holders. Many mechanisms are
available for licensing book chapters or individual journal articles
for reproduction in course packs or E-reserves systems. It is often
appropriate to participate in such purchases. However, we believe
it is not always necessary to do so under a copyright statute that
explicitly recognizes that "multiple copies for classroom use" is an
example of a practice that may be considered fair use.54 A legal
position that payment is always required in contravention of this
explicit authorization exacerbates these fundamental disparities in
access to information and removes an important remedial
mechanism available by law.
III. THE ASSERTION OF FAIR USE ON CAMPUS IS THWARTED BY
A LACK OF CLARITY (WHETHER REAL OR PERCEIVED) IN
COPYRIGHT LAW
The previous section demonstrates significant disparities in the
library materials and resources that are available at U.S. colleges
and universities. Professors rarely limit their teaching to the
materials that happen to be owned by the campus library.
Therefore, some combination of student purchases of course
materials and textbooks, as well as exposure to other materials in
the classroom or via course reserves, occurs on every campus. The
principal basis for providing students with additional classroom
and research materials is afforded under the fair use provision of
U.S. copyright law."5 If the societal benefits that justify a regime
of copyright require that "individuals learn from those
[copyrighted] works, and '[1]earning requires access to the work in
which the ideas to be learned are embodied,' "56 it is of vital
practical importance to consider the boundaries of fair use and
determine how much and how often content that is not owned by
the school may be used in teaching and scholarly pursuits.
5 17 U.S.C. § 107.
5s Id. Other copyright provisions may also support such use, such as the
exemption for classroom displays and performances codified in 17 U.S.C. § 110
(2006).
56 Douglas L. Rogers, Increasing Access to Knowledge Through Fair Use-
Analyzing the Google Litigation to Unleash Developing Countries, 10 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 11 (2007) (quoting Patterson, supra note 8, at 5).
482 [VOL. 11: 461
Fair Use on Campus
However, determining whether a use is fair use is difficult and
time-consuming. This right, defined by statute, requires thought
and engagement. The fair use provision of the Copyright Act
provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The statute appears to create safe harbors, but judicial
interpretation has muddied the clarity that could have evolved from
section 107. It gives examples of uses that may be fair such as
providing "multiple copies for classroom use" and "news
reporting."5  Yet both of these uses are sometimes considered fair
and sometimes found to be infringement."
The statute also contains gaping holes. It does not mention the
Supreme Court's clear admonition that the factors must be
5 17 U.S.C. § 107.
58 Id.
5 For educational copying, compare A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp.
2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008) (making multiple copies of student works to detect
plagiarism was fair use) with Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758
F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding it was not fair use for a commercial
copyshop to make and sell coursepacks). For copyrighted content used in news
reporting, compare Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television Int'l Ltd.,
149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998) (using film of Reginald Denny's beating during
1992 Los Angeles riots for news reporting was not fair use) with Nunez v.
Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (newspaper's
reprinting and distribution of photographs of beauty pageant winner was fair use
because the photos themselves were "newsworthy").
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balanced in light of the purposes of copyright law.6 o The statute
does not mention the increasingly important need to examine the
extent to which the use is transformative. In summary, fair use
analysis is not easy.' It is not neat.6 2 It is not clear. It requires a
vigilant eye over current legal decisions and factual, case-by-case,
intensive review of factors that sometimes conflict.'
The resources required to conduct such an intensive review are
not typically available on an individual basis to most faculty and
students. Professors at institutions with knowledgeable copyright
counsel may have access to resources to use in determining
whether particular uses are fair. Even at such institutions,
however, it is not easy to find an academic or librarian who will
declare that they are using content based on a firm belief and
explicit legal guidance that their use is fair.
In many areas of law, legal responsibilities and rights do not
correspond with practice. Discrimination persists notwithstanding
anti-discrimination laws. Speeding persists despite clearly marked
speed limits. For copyright questions involving fair use, the
absence of clear standards and effective enforcement may
exacerbate the gap between what is likely to be permitted by a
court and what happens in practice.65 Many factors contribute to
the rare evocation of fair use rights. The expense of litigation, lack
60 See infra Part V.B.5.
61 See Gasaway, supra note 4, at 467 ("There are many ambiguities in fair use
analyses.").
62 Id.
63 In her wonderful book, Permissions: A Survival Guide, Blunt Talk about Art
as Intellectual Property, Susan M. Bielstein describes fair use as "steeped in
misunderstanding." SUSAN M. BIELSTEIN, PERMISSIONS: A SURVIVAL GUIDE,
BLUNT TALK ABOUT ART AS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 79 (2006).
6 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (citing
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985))
("The task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the
doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis."). For an interesting
visual interpretation of the factors to be balanced, see Fair Use Visualizer,
http://www.benedict.com/Info/FairUse /Visual izer/Visualizer.aspx (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
65 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2007).
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of familiarity with the legal standards,66 fear of an unfavorable
outcome, or even the extraordinary power imbalance between a
publisher and a scholar can lead to compromises even if a party
believes the use is fair." The lack of clarity (real and perceived) in
copyright law provides exceptional challenges.
Whatever copyright complexities were faced in a pre-digital
world have been dwarfed by those in our current digital learning
environment. Internet technology has fundamentally transformed
how our students learn, how our scholars teach, how academic
research is disseminated, and how libraries function. Today, there
are many new ways in which intellectual property can be taught,
read, shared, copied, disseminated, stolen, and lost. These factors
have led to additional far-reaching legislative changes in the form
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), enacted in
199868 and the Technology Education and Copyright
Harmonization Act ("TEACH Act"), enacted in 2002.69
Application of the fair use standard in the context of new laws and
new technologies requires thought, judgment, and the time to keep
a watchful eye over the ever-changing copyright landscape. In
seeking clarity and avoiding risk to address broad needs, the
temptation to avoid these detailed inquiries and paint "no" with a
broad brush can become the safe zone, particularly when students
and faculty are experimenting with technologies that are not well
understood by legal counsel themselves.
Taking a policy position on fair use is itself deemed risky. As
a result, a host of websites has been created with the hope of
helping faculty and students sort through fair use issues, and many
66 See infra Parts II and III.
67 As Lawrence Lessig points out, even corporate giant Google, Inc. elected
not to wait and see if the courts would affirm the fair use of its book scanning
project, settling with the publishers and authors who filed suit to challenge it.
Lawrence Lessig, For the Love of Culture, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan., 26, 2010,
http://www.tnr.com/article/the-love-culture. See also William M. Landes, An
Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some Preliminary
Results, 41 Hous. L. REV. 749, 772 (2004).
68 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
69 17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (2006).
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offer some guidance.70 However, these resources are often drafted
in general terms and without clear answers to specific scenarios in
order to avoid liability. Therefore, it is difficult to find sufficient
and specific guidance for professors to safely use in teaching and
scholarship. Fearing (and perhaps, hoping) that fair use may apply
differently to an individual researcher than an institution, many
universities avoid proactive policy statements." Lawyers and
university administrators often advise taking conservative positions
in drafting copyright policy and tutorials so they will not be targets
70 For example, Information Circulars and Fact Sheets, United States
Copyright Office, www.copyright.gov/fls/fl 102.pdf; The University of Texas,
Austin, Copyright Crash Course, http://copyright.lib. utexas.edu/; Association of
Research Libraries ("ARL"), http://www.arl.org/sc /copyright/index.shtml;
Columbia University, Libraries/Information Services Copyright Advisory
Office, http://copyright.columbia.edu/; Stanford University Libraries,
http://fairuse.stanford.edu/Copyright and Fair Use Overview/; Website of the
North Carolina State Libraries, Digital Scholarship & Publishing Center,
http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/scc/main.html; University of Minnesota, http://www.
lib.umn.edu/copyright/; University System of Georgia, http://www.usg.edu
/copyright/; The Catholic University of America, General Counsel's website,
http://counsel.cua.edu/ copyright/resources/guidelines/; Center For Social
Media, American University, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf
/copyright _backgrounder.pdf; Free Expression Policy Project at NYU School of
Law, http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/fairuseflyer.html; Berkman
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, http://cyber
.1aw.harvard.edu/home/; Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/;
University of Maryland, Center for Intellectual Property, http://www.umuc.edu
/distance/odell/cip/links.html. Visual Resources Association, Copyright,
Intellectual Property Rights, Fair Use, http://www.vraweb.org/resources
/ipr/copyright.html; NINCH, http://www.ninch.org/copyright/; Resources
Library of the Center For Social Media, American University, http://www.
centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/; Copyright for Music Librarians, Music
Library Association, http://www.musiclibraryassoc.org/ copyright/; JUNE M.
BESEK, CLIR REPORT, COPYRIGHT AND RELATED ISSUES RELEVANT TO DIGITAL
PRESERVATION AND DISSEMINATION OF UNPUBLISHED PRE-1972 SOUND
RECORDINGS BY LIBRARIES AND ARCHIVES (2009), http://www.clir
.org/pubs/reports/publ44/publ44.pdf. (all sites last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
7' However, copyright policies do bubble up through university committees
because some sort of assertive policy statement is necessary to avoid copyright
liability in certain instances. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2006).
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of the publishing industry.72 Fear and risk aversion, rather than a
reflective interpretation of the law, too often influence practical
decisions and copyright policy." Even institutions like ARL often
shy away from taking a firm position on specific questions of fair
use, even though it is highly unlikely that any liability could attach
to such a policy statement designed to help its members.7 4
If fair use is so messy and so hard, why do we live with it? To
answer this question, we must consider the alternative. If fair use
did not exist, and a copyright owner could control all uses that
otherwise would be considered fair, a critic would have to pay
every time he or she wrote a review of a book that contained a
quotation. Permission for use would become a vehicle for
72 This conservative conduct follows the reasoning explained by James Gibson
in Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law. See Gibson,
supra note 65, at 882 ("Intellectual property's road to hell is paved with good
intentions. Because liability is difficult to predict and the consequences of
infringement are dire, risk-averse intellectual property users often seek a license
when none is needed. Yet because the existence (vel non) of licensing markets
plays a key role in determining the breadth of rights, these seemingly sensible
licensing decisions eventually feed back into doctrine, as the licensing itself
becomes proof that the entitlement covers the use. Over time, then, public
privilege recedes and rights expand, moving intellectual property's ubiquitous
gray areas into what used to be virgin territory-where risk aversion again
creates licensing markets, which causes further accretion of entitlements, which
in turn pushes the gray areas even farther afield, and so on. This 'doctrinal
feedback' is not a result of changes in the positive law but is instead rooted in
longstanding, widely accepted doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of
everyone involved. And because feedback is so ingrained in established law and
practice, its various cures tend to create more problems than they solve.").
7 Id.
74 The current ARL website on fair use policy does little more than track the
federal statute and cites only examples of individual uses such as to browse,
read, make a single copy, and "experiment with variations of copyrighted
material for fair use purposes, while preserving the integrity of the original."
ARL, Fair Use in the Electronic Age: Serving the Public Interest,
http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/copyresources/fair use electronic.shtml (last
visited Apr. 5, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology). Notably absent is any reference to whether it would be fair use to
engage in the common practice of including copyrighted content in a scholarly
critique. Id.
SYMPOSIUM 2010] 487
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
censorship of critical commentary." Copyright owners could bar
uses by scholars who want to criticize their work or do not share
their political orientation. Internet companies could not use images
to help the public find information through search engines.
Students at low wealth institutions might be unable to read the
occasional scholarly article or book chapter assigned for a class
from works not licensed by their institutions. If copyright owners
could control criticism, news reporting, and the content we use in
scholarship, teaching, and research, the educational missions of our
institutions would be in grave danger.
It is important to realize that university practices around fair
use will affect the law. Determining fair use involves a case-by-
case analysis-each case considers the market and potential market
for a work.76 Evidence of "custom" may also influence a court's
perception about whether a market exists." Many uses of
copyrighted works that occur on campus have traditionally been
considered fair. Teachers continue to circulate hard copies of
materials, use electronic reserves, and post content on password
protected electronic courseware sites. A real danger, however, is
7 See infra Part V.A. As the real life examples discussed in Part V.A. point
out, such censorship is a reality in situations where a scholar's research is seen
as running counter to family or heirs interested in restricting information from
an archive of previously unpublished materials by important literary or artistic
figures.
76 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d
132, 144-46 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that the defendant's book, based exclusively
on the plaintiffs television show, encroached on a market the plaintiff could
develop and was not a parody; and therefore the fourth factor weighed against a
finding of fair use); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926-
31 (2d Cir. 1994) (considering the potential effect of defendant's use of
plaintiffs work on plaintiffs future journal subscription sales, licensing
revenues, and fees); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792,
804-06 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that defendant's parodic work will not substitute
for products in plaintiffs market for toy dolls); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,
311-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the defendant's two dimensional photograph
based on plaintiffs three dimensional sculpture would undercut the plaintiffs
potential market for licensed uses of his sculpture). But see Blanch v. Koons,
467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that Koons' use of a photographer's
image in a series of paintings had no effect on the plaintiffs market).
n See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 924-25.
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that fear of litigation or reaction to fair use's doctrinal
complications will cause colleges and universities to give up on
fair use and sign on to blanket licenses for all classroom and
courseware use. If this happens, courts may have evidence
(created by academic communities themselves) showing that the
fair use right is outmoded and unnecessary in this context. Or
perhaps even worse, courts may look to evidence created by our
own campus copyright policies and conclude that the critical
balance of factors inherent in fair use analysis has been altered
radically." If handing out copies for classroom learning is
deemed not to be a fair use, providing supplemental copyrighted
content to students will be a luxury only the richest institutions will
be able to afford.
When the law is unclear, fear of litigation drives many to seek
certainty in any form. The cost of certainty is giving away the
argument that a use is fair. Academic authors often assign their
copyrights to those who publish their work. We have both
witnessed how surprised such authors are when their publisher
insists that distribution of a chapter to their class is not a fair use.
These authors never imagined that a publication contract would
take away their right to share excerpts of their own writings with
their students. We have both heard of graduate students who ask
for permission to use content in a thesis, and who must ultimately
change their work when the permission is denied or the requested
fee is too high. We have also worked with faculty authors who are
denied permission to use copyrighted works in scholarly
monographs or have been unable to afford thousands of dollars in
78 It is noteworthy that the complaint filed against Georgia State University
over its course reserves practices and policies specifically notes the university's
apparent failure to take advantage of the "campus license" or other revenue
generating licensing mechanisms provided by such entities as the Copyright
Clearance Center ("CCC"): "For example, through its Academic Permissions
Services (APS), CCC offers professors, library personnel and other licensees a
convenient mechanism for obtaining per-use copyright permission to photocopy,
for coursepacks and classroom handouts, content from books, journals,
magazines and other materials." Complaint at 42, Cambridge Univ. Press v.
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permission fees requested by private copyright owners, museums,
rights clearance houses, and archives in order to reproduce images
in scholarly works that will never generate anything other than de
minimis royalty payments." We work with scholars who face
academic publication contracts that include no acknowledgement
of fair use, requiring written permission for every excerpt or quote
used by the author before the work is accepted for publication.so
As a result of scenarios like these, fair use wilts, and the
educational mission suffers.
It need not happen this way. Fair use can also be a strong
antidote. For example, we have experienced how an opinion letter
from copyright counsel asserting that a particular scholarly use is
fair can be the only path enabling publication of research in a way
that documents the factual foundation for a scholar's critical
analysis. Without strong advocates protecting fair use, academic
institutions may lose the chance for our scholars, musicians, artists,
and scientists to create transformative works that enrich our culture
and expand our minds.
As we indicated above, copyright fair use is a dynamic
principle. As federal laws have expanded copyrights, courts have
recognized a parallel expansion in the doctrine of fair use. In
recent years, many new cases have contributed to clarity, often
adding to our list of uses that a court would consider fair. Before
1985, copying the heart of a work or the whole was not thought to
' Although narrow in scope, recent guidelines published by the University of
Chicago Press (with support from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation) explain
clearly what the Press considers to be fair use of its materials and provide
helpful advance authorization to authors for at least some fair uses of their
content in scholarly publications. See University of Chicago Press, Guidelines
for Fair Use of Our Publications, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago
/permissions.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). If more content owners were willing to publish
similar guidance on fair uses of their materials, some of the pressures on
scholars might ameliorate.
80 See BIELSTEIN, supra note 63, at 95 ("In an increasingly litigious society,
publishers hesitate to risk publishing images for which rights have not been
punctiliously cleared.").
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be a fair use."' Twenty-five years later, we know of several ways
in which both uses can be fair.8 2 Litigation is leading to new case
law that defines new boundaries for what constitutes copyright
infringement and fair use in a digital world. Because much of this
information involves use of content by technology for finding
information, these new fair use beacons, such as A. V. ex rel.
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC and Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com,
Inc.84 have much to teach institutions of higher education. Given
the dynamic evolution of fair use jurisprudence, we must take the
time to reflect on our assumptions about fair use as new authority
emerges. In the section that follows, we strive to clarify some
recent advances in fair use jurisprudence, so that old myths that no
longer reflect current law are less likely to inhibit permissible
practices.
IV. FIVE FAIR USE MYTHS
In this section, five common copyright myths are reexamined
in light of recent authority. Many of the myths identified in this
section have strong pedigrees. However, recent authority
demonstrates that federal courts appear to be adopting a more
expansive view of fair use. This section reexamines these myths
and explores the authority pointing to different conclusions.
A. The Market Myth
The market myth is a common rule of thumb that is used by
many as a fair use shortcut. It provides that if a market exists for
the work, any use of it cannot be considered fair. An example of
81 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
("In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key role in the
infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second Circuit that the 'magazine
took a meager, indeed an infinitesimal amount of Ford's original language.'").
82 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-
50 (1984) (holding that "time-shifting" a work was fair use even though the
entire work was reproduced).
83 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
84 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488
F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d
788 (9th Cir. 2007).
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this reasoning can be found on the website of the Software &
Information Industry Association. It claims that:
If the use in question harms a market for the copyrighted work-
whether it's an actual market or a potential one-fair use is unlikely.
For example, if the copyright holder generally earns revenue by
licensing the use of the work, fair use will probably not apply to
someone who uses the work in the same way without paying for it.85
The fourth fair use factor requires examination of "the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."" The myth that the market factor is more important than
the other fair use factors has a strong pedigree. In 1985, the
Supreme Court found the fourth factor to be the most important.
Nine years later, however, the Supreme Court revised its thinking
on the fair use test. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.," the
Supreme Court found the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
committed reversible error in "giving virtually dispositive weight"
to the fourth factor." Instead, it instructed that all four section 107
factors "are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in
light of the purposes of copyright."90
Review of other recent fair use cases shows that the use of
works may be considered fair even if a licensing market exists.9"




=384 (last visited on Apr. 5, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
86 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
87 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
("This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.").
8 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
89 Id. at 584.
90 Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
91 Many cases permit use of an underlying work despite the existence of a
licensing market. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. (finding commercial use to be
fair where 2 Live Crew sought a license, in a well-established music market, to
create a rap version of "Oh, Pretty Woman"); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v.
Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp.2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that no copyright
supported such a market, and free use of the images was permitted
notwithstanding the well established market for licensing photos of public
domain images). This principle is applied outside the fair use context as well.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that transformative use of
thumbnail images by Google's image search engine was fair use
notwithstanding the existence of a cellular phone download market
for the thumbnail images."
Similarly in Bill Graham Archives v Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,9 3
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the traditional home
for the American publishing industry in New York and not the
most expected venue for a powerful opinion favoring fair use),
found the unauthorized reproduction of seven images of Grateful
Dead posters to be protected by fair use.94 This decision is notable
for its emphasis on the format (small but not quite thumbnail) of
the images used, which the court found instrumental to its findings
of transformative use; the immateriality of the commercial interest
of the fair use proponent; and the almost total disregard paid to the
copyright owner's complaint that the defendant ignored its
"established market for licensing its images(.]""The parties had
negotiated for use of these images but were unable to arrive at an
agreed upon price. In stark contrast to Texaco" where the
Copyright Clearance Center's licensing program strongly affected
the fourth factor, the Second Circuit held that:
DK's use of BGA's images is transformatively different from their
original expressive purpose. In a case such as this, a copyright holder
cannot prevent others from entering fair use markets merely 'by
developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting,
educational or other transformative uses of its own creative work.' 97
See, e. g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(holding the unpaid use to be legitimate because the compilation did not contain
the requisite creativity required for copyright protection although there was a
well-developed market for licensing directory information).
92 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 724-25 (9th Cir.
2007).
93 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
94 Id. at 615.
9 Id. at 614.
96 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir.
1994).
9 Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614-15 (quoting Castle Rock Entm't,
Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 141, 146 n.l 1 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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Because the plaintiffs use was transformative, the existence of a
licensing market had to be analyzed in that context. Quoting
Texaco, the court noted that only "traditional, reasonable, or likely
to be developed markets" are counted in analyzing the fourth
factor.98 Markets for transformative works do not fall in those
categories. The court explained:
[A] publisher's willingness to pay license fees for reproduction of
images does not establish that the publisher may not, in the alternative,
make fair use of those images ... . Since DK's use of BGA's images
falls within a transformative market, BGA does not suffer market harm
due to the loss of license fees. 99
Although market harm will weigh against a finding of fair use, a
thoughtful fair use analysis should not use this factor as a shortcut.
Especially when the use is transformative, the use of the work may
be considered fair even if market harm may be present.
B. The Iterative Copying Myth: Federal Courts Have Decided
that Providing Multiple Copies to Students is Not Fair Use
It is not unusual for copyright owners to act as though there is
definitive precedent regarding iterative copying in the educational
context. The myth we have heard repeatedly is that settled federal
law indicates that providing multiple copies to students is not fair
use. One articulation of this myth can be seen at the web site for
the American Association of Publishers:
Although Section 107 of the Copyright Act includes teaching,
scholarship and research, along with making 'multiple copies for
classroom use,' as among the uses of copyrighted works that may
qualify as fair use, none of these uses automatically qualifies as a fair
use. Both Congress and the Supreme Court have rejected the notion
that all 'educational uses' or all uses by educational institutions are fair
uses. 00
98 Id. at 614 (quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 930).
99 Id. at 615.
00 Association of American Publishers, Higher Education: Questions &
Answers on Copyright for the Campus Community, http://www.publishers.org
/mainl/Copyright/Copy/CopyEdCommittee/copyEdCommittee 01 02.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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Although the first sentence is literally true, the second sentence
creates a misleading impression that federal courts have spoken on
the specific issue in question and have rejected the idea that
copying for classroom use is fair. In fact, they have not yet done
so. What courts (although not the Supreme Court) have found is
that a commercial copyshop may not profit from iterative copying
of materials for coursepacks. o' The issue has not yet been decided
in a non-commercial context of a student or teacher making
multiple copies for classroom use. However, we may soon have
federal precedent directly on point.
On April 15, 2008, Cambridge University Press, Oxford
University Press, and Sage Publications, Inc. filed a copyright
infringement suit against four Georgia State University
administrators alleging that they facilitated unauthorized
distribution of copyrighted materials to students through electronic
reserves and Blackboard sites."o2 If this case does not settle (as
similar disputes have), it could shed much light on the extent to
which providing multiple copies for classroom use may be
considered fair.
Until this carefully watched issue is decided, we still do not
have judicial precedent directly on point. No federal court has
addressed the extent to which providing multiple copies for
classroom use outside of a commercial context is fair use. Two
federal courts have concluded that fair use does not permit a
commercial copy shop to reproduce content in course packs and
sell it for a profit."o3 A third more recent case holds that a
transparent attempt to evade the outcomes in those cases by
requiring students themselves to "push a button" at a commercial
copy shop is not fair use if a commercial entity provides the site
and facilities for student photocopying of readings provided by
'0 See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
102 Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, No. 1:08-CV-1425 (N.D. Ga., Apr. 15,
2008).
103 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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faculty.'" Such for-profit "lending" is a violation of the
distribution right.' It also has not been found to be fair use.I0 6
All three decisions expressly decline to conclude that the
copying would be outside the fair use safe harbor if it were done
by an academic institution, an educator, or a student in a non-
commercial context. In Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics
Corporation,o' the district court held that Kinko's commercial
business of creating and selling course packs was not fair use, but
specifically stated that "the decision of this court does not consider
copying performed by students, libraries, nor on-campus
copyshops, whether conducted for-profit or not."'" In Princeton
University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.,"O9 the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated:
As to the proposition that it would be fair use for the students or
professors to make their own copies, the issue is by no means free from
doubt. We need not decide this question, however, for the fact is that
the copying complained of here was performed on a profit-making
basis by a commercial enterprise."o
Similarly, in Blackwell Publishing, Inc. v. Excel Research Group,
LLC,"' the district court indicated that, "[t]his scenario is vastly
different from a student, who happens to obtain a coursepack from
a friend or other third party and comes into Excel's premises and
makes a copy."ll2
As Chief Judge Merritt eloquently explained in his Michigan
Document Services dissent, a powerful argument for fair use can
be made by examining the plain meaning of the statute."' Section
104 Blackwell Publ'g, Inc. v. Excel Research Group, LLC, 661 F. Supp. 2d
786, 794 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
o Id. at 792.06 id.
'07 758 F. Supp. 1522.
0o Id. at 1536 n.13.
109 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
'o Id. at 1389.
. 661 F. Supp.2d 786 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
112 Id. at 791-92.
"1 In Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th
Cir. 1996), Chief Judge Merritt dissented, writing: "There is no legal precedent
and no legal history that supports our Court's reading of this phrase in a way
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107 states that "the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship or research, is not an infringement of
copyright."" 4 When interpreting other Copyright Act provisions,
the Supreme Court has held in favor of "[s]trict adherence to the
language and structure of the Act" to preserve the balance of
"carefully crafted compromises.""' Many other federal circuit and
district courts have similarly followed this basic rule of statutory
construction in analyzing provisions of the Copyright Act."6 If the
that outlaws the widespread practice of copying for classroom use by teachers
and students." Id. at 1394 (Merritt, C.J., dissenting).
114 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (emphasis added).
"' Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 748
n.14 (1989) (noting with respect to determining if a work is a "work for hire"
under Section 201(b) of the Copyright Act that "[s]trict adherence to the
language and structure of the Act is particularly appropriate where, as here, a
statute is the result of a series of carefully crafted compromises"); see also
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 235 (1990) (relying upon the plain language of
§§ 7 and 3 of the 1909 Act to conclude that "they were enacted in no small part
to ensure that the copyright in the pre-existing work would not be abrogated by
the derivative work").
"
6 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 769
(6th Cir. 2005) (finding that, with respect to § 304(c) of the Copyright Act, "[t]o
determine legislative intent, a court must first look to the language of the statute
itself' and that "[i]f the language of the statute is clear, a court must give effect
to this plain meaning"); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 491 (3d
Cir. 2003) (beginning "the process of statutory interpretation with the plain
meaning of the statute" with regard to whether the digital audio transmission
exemption under § 114(d)(1)(A) applies to AM/FM webcasting); Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 848 (1 Ith
Cir. 1990) (finding that devices that descramble only the video portion of
satellite transmissions still violate 17 U.S.C. § 605 because the statutory
language "defines 'encrypt' as modifying aural, visual, or both transmissions to
prevent unauthorized programming receipt"); Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc.,
439 F. Supp. 2d 872, 882-83 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (indicating with respect to
interpreting "sound recordings" under § 101 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
101 (2006), that "the Supreme Court admonishes that '[s]trict adherence to the
language and structure of the Act is particularly appropriate where, as here, a
statute is the result of a series of carefully crafted compromises' " and that
"[m]oreover, in interpreting a statute, the court must first begin with the text"
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language of the fair use statute is to have any force, some copying
of materials for classroom use will be permitted.
C. The Fair Use is Dead Myth
Pronouncements that fair use is dead or generally inapplicable
abound. The Software and Information Industry Association
("SIIA") bluntly asserts that "[t]he rule of thumb is to assume that
fair use does not apply.""' A publication of the Motion Picture
Association of America ("MPAA") and the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA") claims that, "[u]nless a user
produces a license or subscription agreement from a legitimate
music or movie service, you should assume that copies of music
and movies on your computers are illicit."" 8 Yet it is not difficult
to think of many examples in which having an electronic copy of a
film or musical work would be fair. For example, if a professor
owns a DVD (we will assume that it is not protected by DRM) and
copies it onto his laptop so that an IT colleague can help him
isolate a clip to display in class, he would have a strong argument
that his copying of the DVD was a fair use. Yet assertions like
those of the SIIA, MPAA, and RIAA fuel a common belief that
fair use is remote and shrinking, so it is unsafe and unwise to rely
on it.
The claim that fair use is dead is also not supported by actual
trends in copyright jurisprudence. Professor Barton Beebe
conducted an empirical study in which he analyzed all fair use
opinions decided between 1978 (the year in which section 107 of
because "'[t]he plain meaning of the legislation should be conclusive, except in
the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters' ") (quoting Reid, 490
U.S. at 748, n.14; Bowlds v. General Motors Mfg. Div., 411 F.3d 808, 811 (7th
Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
" Van Buren School District, Copyright Law and Related Issues,
http://www.vbsd.us/copyright.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
'8 MOTION PICTURE ASS'N OF AM., RECORDING INDUSTRY Ass'N OF AM., A
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the 1976 Copyright Act went into effect) and 2005."' "Overall,
30.4% of the preliminary injunction opinions found fair use, while
24.1% of the bench trial opinions did so."120 When the first and
fourth fair use factors favor a finding of fair use, as they will in
many educational contexts, a finding of fair use is nearly
assured.121
Many recent developments indicate that the fair use defense is
growing stronger in both industry and the courts. A study funded
by the Computer & Communications Industry Association
("CCIA") found that "[i]n 2006, fair use industries generated
revenue of $4.5 trillion, a 31 percent increase over 2002 revenue of
$3.5 trillion." 22 The study further indicates that "[flair use
industries also grew at a faster pace than the overall economy.
From 2002 to 2006, the fair use industries contributed $507 billion
to U.S. GDP growth, accounting for 18.3 percent of U.S. current
dollar economic growth."'
Recent court decisions also recognize the fair use of works in
both new contexts and old.'24 After Napster and Grokster, one had
119 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) (In 72% of the cases Beebe studied,
"factors one and four either both favored or both disfavored fair use. In all but
one of these opinions, the outcome of the fair use test followed the outcome of
these two factors.").
120 Id. at 575.
121 See infra Part V.B.1, 4, and 5. See also Beebe, supra note 119, at 584.
122 THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, COMPUTER &
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY:
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE 7 (Sept. 12,
2007), available at http://www.ccianet.org/CCIA/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename
/000000000085/FairUseStudy-Sep 12.pdf.
123 id
124 Many recent decisions affirm fair use after careful evaluation of the four
factors, especially if there is a strong finding of transformative use. See, e.g.,
Warren Publ'g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding
biographical work was intrinsically transformative and use of minor portions of
magazines was within reasonable parameters); Bourne Co. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that all four
factors weighed in favor of fair use finding in action alleging copyright
violations for parody of original popular song "When You Wish Upon a Star");
Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding
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to wonder whether fair use could survive in a world that included
cyberspace.'25 When it became clear that Internet functionality
depends in large part on fair use, the federal courts were not
prepared to let copyright interests interfere.
As discussed above, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,26
Perfect 10 sued Google for infringing copyrighted photographs of
nude models, alleging that Google's search engine provided access
to full-sized images by directing users to third party sites that
hosted them and provided access to thumbnail images of the
photographs through Google's image search feature.'27 The court
affirmed the lower court's ruling that in-line linking is not
copyright infringement because Google did not display or
distribute the image.'28 The court held that Google did, however,
violate Perfect 10's display right by creating, storing, and
displaying thumbnail images of Perfect 10's photographs.'29
Google could avoid liability only if the court found that its use of
the thumbnail images was fair.
The Ninth Circuit proceeded with its fair use analysis. Instead
of focusing on the fourth factor, it proceeded to focus on the first,
specifically the "purpose and character of the use."'30 In examining
whether Google's use of the work was transformative, the court
looked not just at guidance from Campbell on whether the use
added a new "expression, meaning or message,"'"' but also to
whether a defendant uses the plaintiffs copyrighted work "in a
movie producers were likely to prevail on fair use defense because use of the
copyrighted song was transformative, amount and substantiality of the portion
used were reasonable in light of producers' purpose, and the arguably
commercial use and harm to potential market did not weigh as heavily).
125 See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D.
Cal. 2002); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp.
2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
126 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
127 Id. at 713.
128 Id. at 718-19.
129 d. at 717.
30 Id. at 720-23.
131 Id. at 721 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994)).
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new context to serve a different purpose."'3 2 Applying this
principle to the facts before it, the Ninth Circuit held:
Although an image may have been created originally to serve an
entertainment, aesthetic or informative function, a search engine
transforms the image in a pointer directing a user to a source of
information. Just as a 'parody has an obvious claim to transformative
value' because 'it can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an
earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one,' a search engine
provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new
work, namely, an electronic reference tool. Indeed, a search engine
may be more transformative than a parody because a search engine
provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a parody
typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original work.'3
The court weighed the four section 107 factors in light of the
purposes of copyright law.134 In doing so, it reiterated that "[t]he
fair use doctrine thus permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." 3
The court relied on a reading of the purpose of copyright that
embraces both promoting "'the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,' and serving 'the welfare of the public.' " 36
The transformative nature of Google's search engine was the
dominant force that led to a finding of fair use. It was the first
factor, not the fourth factor, that tipped the balance. The Ninth
Circuit explained that Google put the images "to a use
fundamentally different than the use intended by Perfect 10."'"
Notwithstanding the commercial nature of the use, due to the high
transformative value the court concluded that Google's use was
fair despite the facts that a market existed and that the works
themselves were creative.'3 ' A strong finding of transformative use
was also instrumental in a recent Second Circuit decision in which
that court emphatically affirmed that the use of copyrighted images
132 Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
"33 Id. at 721 (citation omitted).
134 Id.
35Id. at 719 (citing Campbell and Abend).
136 Id. at 720 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8 and Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984)).
'7Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007).
I38id.
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by appropriation artist Jeff Koons was fair use.' In view of this
recent authority, the myth that fair use is dead is empirically false.
If fair use appeared to be in danger of demise, it has returned to our
digitally connected world, stronger and more muscular than ever.
D. The Risk Myth: The Burden of Proving the Right to Use
Content in Education is on the University, and Failure to Meet
that Burden Could Expose Academic Institutions to
Exceedingly High Statutory Damages Awards
Academic institutions often assume that a use is not fair unless
they have permission or can find clear precedent indicating that it
is fair use. Many FAQ's and other copyright information
resources provided by copyright holders support this assumption.
For example, Harcourt Education, a publisher of educational
content provides the following information about fair use on its
website:
What is fair use?
"Fair use" is a concept in copyright law that allows the reproduction of
a small amount of copyrighted work without the owner's permission.
Since this term's meaning can be obscure and penalties for
infringement can be severe, we suggest you contact us for
determination.140
This brief statement is the entire answer to the question. Although
the first sentence is literally true, it falsely suggests that only the
use of "small amounts" may be fair.'4 ' It does not provide any
sense of the many mitigating factors at play when examining fair
use in a noncommercial educational context. It also suggests that,
in education, there is no presumption that a use is fair even though
section 107 expressly provides that noncommercial educational use
mitigates in favor of a fair use finding.142 It also sends the strong
'1 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2006). Interestingly, this 2006
decision affirmed powerfully the fair use claim advanced by "appropriationist"
artist Jeff Koons. The same court had earlier dismissed such arguments by the
artist in Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
140 Harcourt Frequently Asked Questions: What is fair use?,
http://permissions.harcourt.com/PermReq/PermFAQ.htm#2 (last visited Apr. 10,
2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
141 See infra Part IV.E.
142 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
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signal that the wrong calculation on fair use can result in "severe
penalties." Furthermore, it suggests that seeking the owner's
permission is the only safe way out of the copyright minefield.
Yet, in copyright litigation, the burden of proof in such a case
would likely be placed on the copyright owner once a prima facie
showing of the defense is set forth.'43 For non-commercial
educational uses, precedent indicates that a court would likely
presume a use to be fair and place the burden of proof on the
copyright owner to demonstrate that it is not. If the use of the
copyrighted work is commercial, the burden of proof for the fourth
factor rests on the alleged infringer.1' However, if the use is not
commercial, the burden of proof on market harm is on the
copyright owner.'45 The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue for the
first time in Perfect 10, holding in the context of a preliminary
injunction proceeding that the copyright owner has "the burden of
demonstrating a likelihood of overcoming Google's fair use
defense under 17 U.S.C. § 107."46 The Perfect 10 decision did not
make the commercial/non-commercial distinction; instead, it states
that the defendant must offer some evidence of fair use, thereafter
the burden of proof is on the copyright owner at the preliminary
injunction stage.'4 7
A university's good faith misstep in the area of copyright
should not be seen as an automatic recipe for disaster as sovereign
immunity and its status as a non-profit organization may protect it
from having to pay high damages. Sovereign immunity has been
found to shield state universities from damages for intellectual
property liability.'4 8 Although sovereign immunity would not
143 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 714 (9th Cir.
2007); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
144 Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (stating that "every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright").
145 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,
1385-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 451) (focusing on the fourth
factor of fair use).
146 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 714.
14 7 id.
148 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Board v. College Say.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress did not have power to
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protect private institutions, their non-profit status is likely to
provide some protection from high damages awards. The damages
section of the copyright statute provides:
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer
believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of
the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer
was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution,
library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her employment
... or such institution, library, or archives itself.149
Therefore, even for private institutions, the actual risk in taking a
legally sound but proactive approach to fair use may be less harsh
than many fear. If academic institutions or educators have
reasonable grounds for believing that a use is fair, section
504(c)(2) can shield them from an exorbitant statutory damages
award.
The idea that uses believed to be fair may expose an academic
institution to high statutory damages is one of the most pernicious
in this field of copyright myths. Sovereign immunity and the plain
language of section 504(c)(2) should provide much comfort to the
risk averse. Recent events provide additional reasons to calm these
pervasive fears. In the copyright litigation lawsuit filed by several
publishers against Georgia State University, the publishers
requested a declaratory judgment and prospective injunctive
relief.' They did not even ask the court for monetary damages.
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity because certain parts of the Patent
Remedy Act could not be squared with the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharm. v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Georgia, No. 3:07-CV-084, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32116, at *62
(M.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2008) (holding that the Board of Regents of the University
System for the State of Georgia and its members were protected through
sovereign immunity from copyright infringement claims).
149 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
150 Complaint at 1, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, No. 1:08-CV-1425
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E. The Whole Work Myth: The Fair Use Defense Is Not Available
to Those Who Copy an Entire Copyrighted Work
The fair use doctrine originated before the advent of the
copying technologies in existence today. It was developed as a
safe harbor for writers who wanted to use excerpts from older
works as a platform for creating new ones.'52 In a print world, it
would have been impossible to conceive of any reason to copy
whole works for reasons such as digital indexing, delayed viewing,
or key word searching. Copying an entire work was thought to bar
a claim for fair use.' However, this whole work bar became a
historical relic after the Supreme Court decision in Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.'54 In Sony, the Supreme Court
held that copying entire television programs onto videocassettes
for private home viewing is fair use.'
Although copying an entire work certainly does not favor fair
use,"' it is important to remember that the third factor alone does
152 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir.
1994):
The traditional fair use analysis, now codified in section 107,
developed in an effort to adjust the competing interests of authors-the
author of the original copyrighted work and the author of the secondary
work that 'copies' a portion of the original work in the course of
producing what is claimed to be a new work.
153 See, e.g., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956).
154 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
'1 See id. at 449 ("[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted
audiovisual work, . . . and that timeshfiing merely enables a viewer to see such
a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the
fact that the entire work is reproduced . . . does not have its ordinary effect of
militating against a finding of fair use.") (emphasis added). Undeniably,
copying an entire work often weighs against fair use. In Texaco, 60 F.3d at 917,
the court held that creating a library of complete photocopied scientific articles
by a Texaco research scientist was not fair use. In analyzing the first factor, the
court relied heavily on the fact that the scientist's copies were made not for
imminent use but to create a "mini-library" for "future retrieval and reference."
Id. at 919. The Second Circuit considered it significant that the scientist had
archived copies but had not even used five of the eight articles at issue in the
case. Id.
156 See Beebe, supra notel20, at 615 (explaining that the more of an original
work that is taken, the less likely there will be a finding of fair use).
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not disqualify a use from being considered fair.'" Even the
conservative photocopying guidelines provide that giving copies of
entire short works to students may be fair use.' Yet, many
copyright industries vigorously promote the idea that copying a
whole work cannot be considered fair use. For example, the
International Association of Scientific, Technical & Medical
Publishers ("STM") and the Professional Scholarly & Publishing
division of the Association of American Publishers ("PSP") issued
Guidelines For Quotation and Other Academic Uses of Excerpts
from Journal Articles.'59 The guidelines permit "single text
extracts of less than 100 words or [a] series of text extracts totaling
less than 300 words for quotation[.]"' However, the STM
guidelines suggest that the copying of whole works is prohibited
under any circumstances: "The use of the entirety of journal
articles or book chapters is not covered by this statement, and
normal permissions clearances through publishers or rights
clearance organizations should be followed for such matters." 6 '
Interestingly, the statement does not mention fair use. The
publishers may argue that they intended to create a statement that
could be used internationally, specifically in nations without fair
use or fair comment protections. Yet, to a U.S. audience, the
guidelines suggest that fair use does not apply in this context and
that the uses mentioned are permitted only through the permission
given by publishers. These guidelines incorrectly imply that
copying a whole work is always outside fair use bounds.
' See, e.g., McGowan v. Cross, No. 92-1480, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9134,7
(4th Cir. 1993) (finding fair use in the copying of architectural plans for
purposes of completing a house even though the third factor weighed in favor of
the copyright owner).
58 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69 (1976) (stating that educational fair
use allows the photocopying of a complete poem less than 250 words or a
complete prose piece of less than 2,500 words).
15 INT'L Ass'N OF SCI., TECH., & MED. PUB., GUIDELINES FOR QUOTATION
AND OTHER ACADEMIC USES OF EXCERPTS FROM JOURNAL ARTICLES,
http://www.stm-assoc.org/2008_02_01 Guidelines forQuotation From
Journal Articles.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
161 id.
506 [VOL. 11: 461
Fair Use on Campus
Once again, recent federal authority tells a story that is
different from the popular myth. In a variety of contexts, federal
courts have found that copying of whole works constitutes fair use.
Barton Beebe's empirical study demonstrates that "[o]f the 99
opinions that addressed facts in which the defendant took the
entirety of the plaintiffs work, 27.3% found fair use. . .. "162 Such
a finding is more likely when, as is often the case in an educational
context, the first factor weighs heavily in favor of fair use. A
decisive tipping of the first factor tends to occur when the use is
transformative. A work may be transformative in at least two
ways: (1) when used as a platform for original expression' and
(2) when used in a "new context to serve a different purpose."'" In
examining whether a work is transformative, many courts, relying
on Campbell, have focused on whether the use added a "new
expression, meaning, or message."' Copying an entire image
may be permitted when necessary for criticism" or news
162 See Beebe, supra note 119, at 616.
163 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(finding that a work is considered transformative where it "adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message").
16 See Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 722 (9th Cir. 2007)
("[A] use is considered transformative only where a defendant changes a
plaintiffs copyrighted work or uses the plaintiffs copyrighted work in a
different context such that the plaintiffs work is transformed into a new
creation.").
165 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[C]opying the entirety of a
work is sometimes necessary to make a fair use . . ."); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986) (copying and
distributing thousands of copies of the entirety of a parody from Hustler
magazine was found to be fair use when distributed to criticize the content of the
advertisement); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 862 F. Supp.
1044, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (concluding that Columbia's portrayal of
Amsinck's artwork on a baby mobile in approximately ninety-six seconds of its
film constitutes fair use even though the artwork on the mobile was seen in its
entirety during that timeframe).
166 Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. v. Delsman, No. C 09-1468
SBA, 2009 WL 2157573 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2009).
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reporting. 6 1 It may also be sufficiently transformative to use a
reduced version of an entire work if the image is used to provide a
visual reference for explanatory text. 68
More recently, new uses have been deemed transformative
even if they added no expressive value, but simply used "the
plaintiffs copyrighted work in a different context." 69 In A. V. ex
rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC,"'7 students sued a company
that copied their academic papers for use on a plagiarism detection
site. The defendant ran the online "Turnitin Plagiarism Detection
Service," to help teachers catch plagiarists by analyzing whether
the student work was original or copied from an outside source.'
In order to function, the service copied all of a student's paper.
The district court found that this use was fair.'7 2 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed because use of the student
"works had an entirely different function and purpose than the
original works; the fact that there was no substantive alteration to
the works does not preclude the use from being transformative in
nature."' This authority should not be ignored. Instead, academic
institutions should thoughtfully consider the contexts in which
167 See Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding the third factor "as of little consequence" and holding that El Vocero's
reprinting of Nunez's photographs in their entirety constituted fair use because it
was necessary for a critique of whether the photographs were pornographic in
nature).
168 See Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613.
169 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 721 (quoting Wall Data, Inc. v. Los Angeles
County Sheriffs Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 2006)) (concluding that
Google's use of entire reduced quality Perfect 10 images was reasonable and fair
for the purpose of a search engine); see also Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121
(D. Nev. 2006) (finding fair use and indicating that "the third fair use factor is
neutral, despite the fact that Google allowed access to the entirety of Field's
works" because "like the fair uses in Sony and Kelly, Google's use of entire Web
pages in its Cached links serves multiple transformative and socially valuable
purposes" that "could not be effectively accomplished by using only portions of
the Web pages").
170 A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
171 Id. at 634.
172 A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp.2d 473, 484 (E.D. Va. 2008).
' A. V. ex rel. Vanderhye, 562 F.3d at 639.
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copying content may be just as fair as private taping of free
television programs, copying student papers to catch plagiarism,
and making thumbnail images to enable Internet search
technology.
V. USE OF CONTENT IN SCHOLARLY PUBLICATIONS
One of the most significant fair use questions arises when a
scholar seeks to use copyrighted content in a publication but is
uncertain whether permission is necessary. Academic authors
often need to provide their readers with a reduced sized image,
song lyrics, a poem, or excerpt from a text in order to provide a
foundation for their scholarly observations and to critically
evaluate the subject of the research. However, neither faculty
authors nor academic presses have abundant resources to pay
permission fees for use of content in scholarly works or legal fees
to obtain fair use opinion letters. Publishers, universities, and
scholars would all benefit immensely from robust fair use
practices in scholarly publications. Yet, too often, even the threat
of a baseless suit appears sufficient to shut down the use of
content in a scholarly work. Timidity has resulted in unfortunate
deletions from modem scholarship. The following stories
illustrate that reliance on fair use can make a profound difference
in the quality of scholarship that is available to enrich our
culture.'74 After recounting the stories, we will explain why
copyright law will generally favor a finding of fair use for




Brandeis University musicologist Liane Curtis wrote a book
about the composer Rebecca Clarke."' Richard Johnson owns the
copyrights to Rebecca Clarke's unpublished works. After initially
174 These examples were first presented in a paper delivered by Madelyn
Wessel and Diane Walker of the University of Virginia Library to the Music
Library Association Annual Meeting in Memphis, Tennessee in February, 2006.
1' A REBECCA CLARKE READER (Liane Curtis ed., 2004) (withdrawn).
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authorizing Curtis's scholarly references to the music, he
apparently changed his mind after he learned that Curtis was
critical of how he administered Clarke's musical legacy.' 6
Johnson withdrew the permission he initially gave Curtis. After
the book was released, Johnson threatened litigation."' In
response, Indiana University Press recalled the book and the editor
told Curtis to remove all contested material."' As a result, Curtis
deleted three chapters from the book. She left individual lines and
short quotations here and there, considering them to be well within
the bounds of fair use and essential to illustrate her scholarly
analysis."' The redacted book was 241 pages long.'" The
contested portions amounted to ninety-four lines of material, the
equivalent of slightly more than two pages of the book and less
than one percent of the text."' Johnson refused to accept even
those fragmentary references. He sent a letter to the Press,
threatening to sue. Then, "Ms. Rabinowitch, of Indiana University
Press, contacted university lawyers after receiving the letter. An
outside copyright expert was also consulted. 'Their advice,' she
says, 'was to withdraw the book because of the inclusion of
previously unpublished material.' "182
Lawrence Lessig offered the following analysis at the time the
controversy erupted:
[T]he restrictive interpretation of copyright asserted by Mr. Johnson
and his lawyer is symptomatic of what has become a 'significant
problem' for scholars. It is so significant . . . that many contracts
between authors and presses seek to 'avoid any possibility of a lawsuit.
Not legitimate lawsuits, but any.' 83
76 Id.
17 Richard Byrne, Silent Treatment: A Copyright Battle Kills an Anthology of
Essays About the Composer Rebecca Clarke, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July
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Ms. Curtis wanted Indiana University Press to use her book to test
fair use, but it would not take the risk. The Chronicle of Higher
Education reported the incident in a context demonstrating that it
is not unique:
[A]s belts tighten at university presses, there is little cash or inclination
to be guinea pigs for fair use. 'You could argue that this is fair use and
you could argue that it isn't,' says Ms. Rabinowitch. She says the press
chose caution over confrontation. 'No one has $11 -million to test the
gray areas,' concurs Ms. Sherwood.184
At this time, Sanford G. Thatcher served as director of the
Pennsylvania State University Press and on the Copyright
Committee of the Association of American University Presses. He
agreed that most university presses have little freedom to test the
provisions of the law. Mr. Thatcher said, "That's part of the setup
with a university press.. . . The university tells you what to do. It's
not as if the press has an independent say. The university will end
up saddled with the bill."'
Indeed, such incidents are not unique.'" As Wendy Seltzer, an
attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, observed:
184 Id
185 Id.
186 British musicologist Sheila Whiteley's book, Too Much Too Young,
Popular Music, Age and Identity was due for publication in Canada and the
United States in July 2003. The book had been printed; she had received her
advance copies and was looking forward to the book's promotion at a
conference in Montreal. "Suddenly, a telephone call from my editor informed
me that they had recalled the books, copyright permissions had not been
received." Sheila Whiteley, Copyright and Popular Musicology, 23 POPULAR
Music, 203, 203 (2004). Whiteley had included lyrics from popular songs,
carefully following the guidance offered by her publisher for quoting brief
passages of poetry or prose. That guidance cited the "convention known as 'fair
dealing for purposes of criticism and review'" and stated that under this
convention permission "need not be sought for short extracts provided that the
content is quoted in the context of 'criticism or review.'" Id. Specifically, the
publisher defined a short excerpt "in poetry [as] not more than 40 lines from a
poem, providing that this does not exceed a quarter of the poem." Id at 204.
Whiteley reports that in following this guidance, she limited the excerpts and
transcriptions for each song she included. She believes that "if these were
poetry or prose, they would be within the limits for 'fair dealing."' Id. What
Whiteley learned during that phone call from her editor was that her publisher
was too afraid of litigation to attempt to enforce their policy on fair dealing.
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Even when it's very likely that a short quotation would be fair,
publishers are afraid to litigate and afraid of the potential damages if
they lost. The economics of publishing makes presses and universities
unduly risk averse. Too often, then, our fair use rights are lost not in
court, but because no one even takes them to court.18 7
The impact of an increasingly litigious copyright community has
caused many to question whether fair use will survive.'
Not every fair use battle can or should be resolved in a manner
that will make the fair use proponent happy, but there is something
terribly wrong if universities and publishers acquiesce in the
removal of copyrighted content from scholarly works purely from
fear of a lawsuit or a failure of legal support. It is critical not to
forget fair use and to fight for its application when a work that is
compliant with reasonable fair use guidelines is subject to bullying
and threats of litigation. Our next story illustrates that these fights
can be fought and won, at times with relative efficiency.
2. Carol Loeb Shloss
Carol Loeb Shloss wrote a book, Lucia Joyce: To Dance in the
Wake, about the complex relationship between James Joyce and his
troubled daughter, Lucia. The copyrights in works by James Joyce
are controlled by his nephew, Stephen Joyce, who is notorious for
denying scholars permission to quote from Joyce's works.'" "In
Their general rule, in spite of their guidance that brief extracts could be quoted
without permission, was: "If the author is a well-known literary figure, you
should seek permission as a matter of course. The general rule is: if in doubt,
seek permission." Id.
187 Transcript of "Colloquy Live" on-line discussion moderated by Richard
Byrne, The Chronicle of Higher Education, http://chronicle.com/colloquylive
/2004/07/copyright/ (July 14, 2004, 1-2 EST) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
188 See MAJORIE HEINS & TRICA BECKLES, THE FREE EXPRESSION POLICY
PROJECT, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF
COPYRIGHT CONTROL (Dec. 2005), http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/
fairuseflyer.html.
189 D. T. Max, The Injustice Collector, 82 THE NEW YORKER 34, June 19,
2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/06/19/060619fa
fact (indicating that "[m]ore than a dozen Joyce scholars told me that what was
once an area of exploration and discovery now resembles an embattled outpost
of copyright law").
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2002 ... Stephen wrote to Shloss, implying that he might sue if
she quoted from copyrighted material. He pressured her publisher,
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, which asked Shloss to cut many
quotations." 0 As the dispute was brewing, Shloss met Lawrence
Lessig, and Stanford University's Fair Use Project decided to back
her fair use claim. The book was first published in December 2003
without most of the quoted material. 9 ' Reviews of her book
challenged her scholarship as lacking sufficient evidence.'92 Ms.
Shloss responded by creating a web-based supplement to the
work.'9 3 The Joyce Estate threatened to sue. In June 2006, Ms.
Shloss filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California seeking a declaration that the material she wished to
publish was a transformative academic work protected by fair
use.'94 A settlement gave the scholar "exactly what she asked for
in her complaint, and more."I95 Two years after settling the issue
of fair use, Ms. Shloss settled her claims for attorneys' fees against
the Joyce Estate for $240,000. Commenting on the settlement, Ms.
Shloss stated:
It's a breakthrough, not just for me but for everybody who has to deal
with a literary estate . . . . This has been going on for decades.
Scholars are not wealthy people. We don't have easy access to the
legal system to determine and vindicate our rights if someone threatens
us with a lawsuit. You just have to give in.
They know that scholars have resources now. They just can't be
bullies .. . . We've established that if you don't pay attention to the
190 Id.
191 See Andrea L. Foster, Lawsuit Over James Joyce Web Site May Clarfy





'9 See Leslie Simmons, James Joyce copyright case settled in California,
REUTERS, Mar. 24, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2427943
720070324 (last visited Apr. 4, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
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rights of scholars, authors and researchers the copyright laws protect,
you might have to pay something as the Joyce Estate has had to pay.196
As these stories illustrate, the assertion of fair use can make a huge
difference in the quality of scholarship that will be available to
enrich our understanding and appreciation of our culture.'
B. Fair Use Analysis of Content Appearing in Scholarly
Publications
Too often, a blinkered view of fair use drives the extent to
which scholars may display and quote copyrighted content in their
published work. The fact that a rights clearing house is ready and
willing to charge a fee for the use of an image, song lyrics, a few
lines of poetry, or several paragraphs of text should not end the fair
use analysis. The assumption that permission is required is
especially unfortunate when permission is not available. We have
both spoken with scholars who have been compelled to remove
copyrighted content from scholarly works because permission was
not attainable or the license fee was too expensive. Scholars
should be supported in the belief that fair use provides a third
option. This section outlines a guide to fair use analysis in such
situations.
196 Cynthia Haven, Stanford Researcher Gets Six-Figure Settlement From
James Joyce Estate, STANFORD REPORT, Sept. 28, 2009, http://news.stanford
.edu/news/2009/september28/shloss-joyce-settlement-092809.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
197 A growing number of university copyright counsel, law school clinics, and
centers provide pro bono intellectual property services and may be willing to
provide support for scholars facing fair use battles. See, e.g., Samuelson Law,
Technology & Public Policy Clinic, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/4391.htm;
University of Connecticut Intellectual Property and Entrepreneurship Law
Clinic, http://www.law.uconn.edu/content/intellectual-property-and-
entrepreneurship-law-clinic; The Stanford Center for Internet & Society,
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/; University of San Francisco School of Law
Internet and Intellectual Property Justice Clinic, http://www.law.
usfca.edu/clinics/internetjustice.html; Washington University Intellectual
Property and Nonprofit Organizations Clinic, http://www.wulaw.wustl
.edu/IPTech/; DePaul University College of Law Center for Intellectual Property
Law & Information Technology, http://www.law.depaul.edu/centersinstitutes/
ciplit/curriculum/clinic.asp (all sites last visited Feb. 24, 2010) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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To determine the general arc of fair use analysis in academic
scholarship, we will assume that an academic author would like to
use excerpts from a copyrighted work as the foundation for critical
commentary in an academic essay, article, or book. We will also
assume that the scholar is seeking to use individual units of
copyrighted content that would fill less than a single printed page,
such as an entire reduced quality image, a poem, several
paragraphs from a longer textual work, or lyrics and musical
notations for a song.
Our hypothetical author seeks to use the copyrighted content in
a publicly available format. Therefore, the use may violate the
copyright owner's exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, publicly
display, and publicly distribute the work unless a defense is
available.'" The copyright statutes indicate that these exclusive
rights belonging to a copyright owner are "subject to" certain
exceptions, including fair use,'9 9 and that the fair use of the
copyrighted work is "not an infringement" of copyright.200 As
noted above, fair use analysis requires the balancing of four
statutory factors in light of the purposes of copyright law.20 ' The
need to weigh these factors in light of copyright purposes is just
one of many examples provided below in which thoughtful fair use
analysis requires knowledge beyond the plain language of the
statute.
We turn next to the many considerations that should be
weighed within each factor. We caution our readers, that by
definition, the fair use analysis includes these factors but is not
limited to those we list. Rather, each case presents unique
considerations that should be analyzed.
1. The First Factor
The first factor requires examination of the purpose and
character of the defendant's use of the copyrighted work.2 02 It
instructs the courts to examine "whether such use is of a
'
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
1 Id.
200 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
201 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
202 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
Symposium 2010] 515
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."203 It
has been interpreted to mean that "nonprofit educational" uses will
weigh in favor of fair use and "commercial" uses will weigh
against such a finding.2 04 But these are not the only elements
weighed in the first factor.
In analyzing the nature of the use, the Supreme Court indicated
that it is helpful to consider the "preamble paragraph" of section
107 appearing before the first factor.205 It states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. 206
The scholarly use being analyzed here is clearly for purposes
deemed to be fair in the preamble of the statute-specifically,
"criticism," "comment," "teaching," "scholarship," and
"research." 207 The plain language of section 107 suggests that such
scholarly use would be fair. However, publishers exercise caution
about interpreting these categories as exemptions. In view of
current precedent, they are right to do so. The "mere fact that a use
is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding
of infringement, any more than the commercial character of a use
bars a finding of fairness."208 Courts have not interpreted the uses
203 id.
204 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-80.
205 See id. at 577.
206 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
207 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (stating that 17 U.S.C. § 107 was
created based on the "long controversy over the related problems of fair use and
the reproduction ... of copyrighted material for educational and scholarly
purposes"); see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG.,
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (Comm. Print 1961) (noting examples protected under
fair use when the purpose of the use was to illustrate, clarify, or comment on a
specific point).
208 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S 569, 584 (1994). See id. at
577-78 ("The text employs the terms 'including' and 'such as' in the preamble
paragraph to indicate the 'illustrative and not limitative' function of the
[VOL. 11: 461516
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listed in the preamble as circumscribed safe harbors.209 However,
the Supreme Court indicated that these uses do provide "general
guidance" about uses that have been traditionally deemed to be fair
ones.210 When a use matches examples from the preamble, that fact
will tend to weigh in favor of fair use when analyzing the first
factor. Even if a use is commercial in the sense that the author
may profit from it, the first factor may weigh in favor of fair use if
the context matches one of the categories listed in the preamble. 2 '
Therefore, although the scholarly, research-oriented, and critical
nature of the use is not per se fair, it does weigh heavily in favor of
a fair use finding.
All of these scholarly purposes tip in favor of fair use on
another critically important variable in analyzing the first factor:
the extent to which the use is "transformative." 212 In determining
whether a work is transformative, many courts rely on Campbell
and focus on whether the use adds new "expression, meaning, or
message." 213 A scholarly use does just that. It is transformative
because it uses the copyrighted work as a foundation to
communicate original ideas and critical analysis. Just like a lawyer
before a jury, in order to convince the audience of her theory an
academic needs to provide the evidentiary basis to support her
argument.2 4 An academic must quote from the work on which she
examples given . . . which thus provide only general guidance about the sorts of
copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair uses.").
209 See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (indicating that creating
multiple copies for classroom use may not be considered fair if done or made
possible by a commercial enterprise).
210 Campbell, 510 U.S at 577-78.
211 Id. at 584-85.
212 Id. at 579 (defining transformative use as use that "adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message").
213 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605,
613 (2d Cir. 2006); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d
1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 1986) (copying and distributing thousands of copies of the
entirety of a parody from Hustler magazine was found to be fair use when
distributed to criticize the content of the advertisement).
214 An elegant demonstration of such a tactic is found in the Supreme Court's
own decision in Campbell, where the Court cited the entire lyrics from both
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
bases her theory. Such a discussion is the kind of transformative
work Congress intended to protect when drafting the fair use
statute, as it fits squarely within five of the six illustrative
examples from the preamble.2 5
Recently, uses of copyrighted works have been deemed
transformative even if they added no expressive value but simply
used the plaintiffs work in a "different context"' 16 and for a "new
purpose"'217 such as "an electronic reference."2 18 Similarly, an
academic author fits within this more liberal definition by offering
the work, not to replace a use by the copyright owner, but to
comment on the work and explain something about its
significance. Such scholarly uses are more transformative than
many of the uses described in recent cases because in addition to
using the work for a different purpose and in a different context,
scholarly analysis adds much expressive content. Application of
the fair use doctrine in such settings is also critical in order to
assure that copyright law is not used as a tool to suppress critical
speech protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The Supreme Court has encouraged counsel to remain mindful that
to support expressive interests, "the fair use defense affords
considerable 'latitude for scholarship and comment.' "219
songs as a way to illustrate its fair use analysis. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S 569, 594-96 (1994).
215 See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
216 Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir
2006).
217 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003).
218 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007);
see also Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821; Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106,
1121 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding fair use and indicating that "the third fair use
factor is neutral, despite the fact that Google allowed access to the entirety of
Field's works" because "like the fair uses in Sony and Kelly, Google's use of
entire Web pages in its Cached links serves multiple transformative and socially
valuable purposes" that "could not be effectively accomplished by using only
portions of the Web pages"); A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp.2d 473, 484
(E.D. Va. 2008) (holding that it is fair use to copy student papers for an on-line
tool to detect plagiarism).
219 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)).
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In analyzing the first factor, one must also examine the extent
to which a use is "commercial." 2 20 Although a professor may have
a primary motive of advancing her research agenda and exposing
new thoughts about prior work, publication may also lead to
financial benefits. The publication may generate royalties,
improve her reputation, or lead to a lucrative job offer or research
grant. 22' Therefore, to the extent that the use might be regarded as
"commercial," it would weigh against a finding of fair use but will
not necessarily defeat it. 222
However, even if the work is offered for sale, the extent to
which a work is considered transformative may be dispositive of
the finding with respect to the first factor. Barton Beebe found
that:
[I]n those opinions in which transformativeness did play a role, it
exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on the outcome of factor
one but on the overall outcome of the fair use test . . . . [A] finding of
tranformativeness trumped a finding that the defendant's use was
commercial for purposes of determining whether factor one favored fair
use. In 28 opinions, the court found the defendant's use to be both
commercial and transformative under factor one, and in 26 of these
opinions, the court found both that factor one and the overall test
favored fair use-with one of the two outliers reversed on appeal.223
More and more courts since Campbell are finding that the
expressive value of highly transformative works justifies a finding
of fair use even if the use may result in commercial gain to the
user.2 24 As the Supreme Court noted in Campbell:
[The] goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie
at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright . . . and the more transformative the
new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like
commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. 225
220 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
221 John J. Siegfried & Kenneth J. White, Teaching and Publishing as
Determinants ofAcademic Salaries, 4 J. ECON. EDUC. 90 (1973).
222 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S 569, 579 (1994).
223 See Beebe, supra note 120, at 605-06.
224 See Campbell, 510 U.S at 572.
225 Id. at 579.
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Clearly, an academic's use of a work for the purposes of
research and criticism would be at least as transformative as the
parody in Campbell. Moreover, a scholarly use of content in a
critical text is not primarily commercial. Such works sell far fewer
copies and reap far fewer financial gains than even conventional
literary works, let alone the type of new recording by popular
artists validated in Campbell.226 For all of the reasons set forth
above, a scholarly work that uses limited portions of copyrighted
content as a foundation for critical commentary mirrors many of
the fair use examples in the preamble and is both highly
transformative and non-commercial. Therefore, the first factor
should tip decisively in the scholar's favor.
2. Second Factor
The second factor requires examination into "the nature of the
copyrighted work" at issue.2 27 This factor tends to favor the
copyright owner when a work is creative but may favor the person
226 As explained by Penny Kaiserlian, Director of the University of Virginia
Press and a past President of the Association of American University Presses,
most academic presses operate non-commercially, particularly in regards to their
publication of scholarly monographs. This fiscal reality has become starker over
time. Whereas a scholarly book published in the 1970s may typically have had
an initial print run of 2,500 to 3,000 copies, the number would now more likely
be between 500 and 1,000, depending on the seniority of the scholar and her
prior publishing record. Academic presses cannot maintain their operations
solely on monograph sales. All seek other revenue sources or subsidies, whether
from their home universities, grants, or other publications. Many scholarly
books today can only be published with payments from the institution of the
individual academic author to help subsidize the cost of publishing the book.
This is especially the case for works in art history, architecture, or other
disciplines where works include significant numbers of images. Such payments
are in addition to the permissions fees and other image costs that authors are
routinely expected to bear in their publication agreement with presses. The
Association of American University Press does a survey each year. The
operating statistics for 66 reporting presses in 2008 show that overall 86.6% of
costs for book publication were covered by sales income or other Press efforts.
The remaining 13.4% came from parent institutions, endowment income, or title
subsidies. Telephone Interview with Penny Kaiserlian, Director, University of
Virginia Press (Jan. 10, 2009).
227 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
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seeking to use the work if it is factual.228 If the works were
previously published and are readily available through other
media, this factor does not necessarily weigh as heavily in favor of
the copyright owner. 2 9  Similarly, if a work has been widely
published on the Internet, the second factor is weighed less heavily
in favor of the copyright owner than other less accessible works
such as those not yet published.230
Although musical works are quintessentially creative, some
additional mitigating factors may be important. Much popular
music may be based on prior works in the public domain.
Unfortunately, sometimes musicians assert copyright ownership in
songs that they did not write.23 1 If litigated, each copyright owner
would only be able to assert ownership over material he or she
independently created. If the extent to which much of this material
is protected by copyright is debatable, evidence indicating that a
prior version is in the public domain or was created by another
would weaken the copyright owner's argument for this factor.
Works that are creative and unpublished will weigh most
heavily against a finding of fair use. But it would be clearly
erroneous to permit this factor alone to drive the fair use analysis.
In 1990, Congress amended section 107 to make explicit that
"[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use . . . .*"23 As the Supreme Court cautioned in Campbell,
when a use is transformative this factor is deemed less important in
228 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153-
54 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The scope of fair use is greater when 'informational' as
opposed to more 'creative' works are involved.").
229 Perfect 10, Inc. v Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 723-24 (9th Cir. 2007).
230 S. REP. No. 94-473, at 64 (1975) ("A key, though not necessarily
determinative, factor in fair use is whether or not the work is available to the
potential user. If the work is 'out of print' and unavailable for purchase through
normal channels, the user may have more justification for reproducing it than in
the ordinary case.").
231 See JOCELYN R. NEAL, THE SONGS OF JIMMIE RODGERS: A LEGACY IN
COUNTRY Music (2008) (demonstrating that some popular blues songs may be
in the public domain even though many in the music industry treat them as
protected by copyright).
232 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2009).
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"separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats."23
Important new scholarship often focuses on previously
unpublished archival materials. The personal writings of a famous
poet or musician, including letters, drafts, or other previously
unpublished works, might be highly creative. For unpublished
works, this factor may be found to weigh in favor of the copyright
owner. However, scholarship that reveals buried intellectual
treasures would be especially transformative. Therefore, any
tipping of the second factor on this basis would likely be
counterbalanced by a heavy weight in favor of fair use on the first
factor.
3. The Third Factor
In order to assess the third factor, one must weigh "the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole."23 4 One must ask whether the use is "reasonable
in relation to the purpose of the copying."2 35 The evaluation of this
factor is highly contextual. The Supreme Court indicated that
"substantial quotations might qualify as a fair use in a review of a
published work or a news account of a speech"236 but not if the
work was an unpublished presidential memoir that was stolen so
one publisher could "scoop" a competitor.2 37 In some situations,
such as the unauthorized downloading of a copyrighted song
readily available at a reasonable price, copying the entire
copyrighted work may weigh strongly against a finding of fair
use.238 As noted above, in other contexts copying an entire work
233 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S 569, 586 (1994).
234 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
235 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
236 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 601
(1985).
237 See id. at 542.
238 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir.
2001) ("While 'wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per se,' copying an
entire work 'militates against a finding of fair use.' ") (quoting Worldwide
Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th
Cir. 2000)).
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may be considered fair, especially if the use does not interfere with
the copyright owner's market or potential market.239
Courts are more likely to conclude that an entire work may be
copied if the use is transformative-for illustrative purposes or for
comment and criticism. For example, as noted above, in Bill
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.,240 the use of reduced
sized images of Grateful Dead posters in a retrospective book was
found to be fair.24' In Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp.,242 the
reprinting of modeling photographs in their entirety constituted fair
use because they involved a critique of whether the photographs
were pornographic in nature.243 In Nunez, the third factor was
deemed "of little consequence." 24 4  In Perfect 10, reduced size
images of nude models displayed by an electronic search engine
were found to be fair use. 245 Although the entire image was copied,
the court held that in this transformative context, the third factor
"favored neither party."246
For short works, it may be necessary to copy the whole work in
order to give one's audience a sufficient quantity for evaluation.
Therefore, for cases involving short works, the third factor may not
be weighed as heavily. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc.,247 the copying and distribution of thousands of
copies of the entirety of a parody was found to be fair use because
the intent was to criticize the advertisement. 248 The work at issue
included 300 words of text.249 The district court indicated that "[i]n
the case of such a short work the court believes that the
substantiality of the copying should not be given great weight in
239 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449
(1984).
240 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).
241 Id. at 613.
242 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).
243 Id. at 20.
244 Id. at 24.
245 Perfect 10, Inc. v Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 708 (9th Cir. 2007).
246 Id. at 724.
247 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986).
248 Id. at 1 154-55.
249 Id. at 1154 n.10.
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determining fair use."250 Use of an entire work that is short
mitigates against attaching substantial weight to the third factor.
Use of an entire long work may weigh against a finding of fair
use with respect to this factor. But again, this factor alone should
not drive the conclusion, and use of an entire work does not
necessarily mean that the third factor weighs heavily against fair
use. Based on the precedent set forth above, the third factor may
be found to be neutral even if a scholar has used the entirety of a
short work or an excerpt from a longer one. It is also important to
note that a court should examine the third factor in relation to the
particular use. Although the statute is silent on this point, the
Supreme Court has stated that in examining the third factor,
"context is everything." 2 5 1 Therefore, if a use is highly
transformative, a court is likely to permit more quantitative and
qualitative copying.
4. The Fourth Factor
For the final factor, a court must examine "the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 25 2
The Supreme Court in Sony indicated that "[i]f the intended use is
for commercial gain, . . . likelihood [of market harm] may be
presumed."2 53  However, in Campbell the Court qualified this
statement by holding that "[n]o 'presumption' or inference of
market harm that might find support in Sony is applicable to a case
involving something beyond mere duplication for commercial
purposes."25 4 The academic uses discussed in this section are not
mere duplication. Instead, the works are copied as platforms for
transformative scholarly commentary.
When a work is used as a foundation for a scholarly,
educational, and critical message, this factor tips decisively in
favor of the academic writer. The Supreme Court has
250 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1538
n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
251 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S 569, 589 (1994).
252 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
253 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984).
254 Campbell, 510 U.S at 591.
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unequivocally held that "the law recognizes no derivative market
for critical works." 25 5 Because a copyright owner is not likely to
license a work for critical commentary, there is no true market for
use of an excerpt. Generally, only "reasonable" markets may be
usurped under the fourth factor.256 The Supreme Court has
explained:
[T]here is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The market
for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original
works would in general develop or license others to develop. Yet the
unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical
reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from
the very notion of a potential licensing market.257
Thus, in contexts involving critical commentary, the law does not
recognize an actual or potential market. For this reason alone,
critical scholarly works do not infringe on any market that exists,
or would reasonably be developed by the copyright owners.
Therefore, the fourth fair use factor would weigh in favor of fair
use. However, there are additional considerations.
In practice, licensing markets exist. Permissions for use of
images, text, and music in scholarly texts are assessed and paid by
scholars and publishers for the uses we claim to be fair. Still,
looking directly at this factor, we predict it is unlikely that a
scholarly text that quotes a song would be found to damage an
actual or potential market for the recording or musical
composition. Moreover, an elusive market that is meant to muzzle
a critic is not a true market. As the Curtis and Shloss examples
demonstrate, sometimes copyright owners will assert rights even
when a use is fair in an effort to silence critical speech.258
If a scholar is prevented from using content to support a
scholarly claim, then market failure has served as a prior restraint
on speech, and both copyright and First Amendment values are
compromised. It is precisely this loss to education and culture that
255 Id. at 592.
256 id.
257 id258 Supra Part V.A.
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fair use is meant to avoid. 25 9 Finally, we believe that assessment of
the fourth fair use factor in light of a demand for fees should take
into account the disparity in access to legal and financial resources.
Unfortunately, such a situation is more likely to occur for those
who have smaller coffers in which to dip for permission fees and
less access to copyright counsel for the assertion of fair use.
5. Weighing the Factors in Light of Copyright Purposes
Fair use analysis is not complete after examination of the four
factors listed in section 107. Here again, it is essential to have
access to the advice of knowledgeable copyright counsel because
the statute does not reveal the next step in the analysis. After the
four fair use factors have been weighed individually, "[a]ll are to
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright." 2 60  For cases involving critical
commentary, the first and fourth factors will always weigh heavily
in favor of fair use. Even if the second and third factors are
analyzed as a counterweight, they are unlikely to tip the balance,
especially when weighed in view of the purposes of copyright law.
The U.S. Constitution gave Congress the power to pass
copyright laws "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."26 1 Permitting references to copyrighted works in academic
scholarship advances this constitutional purpose. Narrowing fair
use to enable censorship of critical commentary would thwart the
progress clause and other constitutional values. In order for
copyright to function without unduly burdening First Amendment
expressive values, the fair use doctrine must continue to serve as a
259 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) ("In addition to spurring the
creation and publication of new expression, copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations. First, it distinguishes between ideas and
expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protection.
Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) provides: 'In no case does copyright protection
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.'").
260 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S 569, 578 (1994).
261 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 cl. 8.
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safe harbor for new ideas that evolve out of copyrighted works.2 62
Favoring fair use in this context advances copyright goals and
protects First Amendment values of free expression.
Copyright law was enacted to fuel the educational mission, not
to thwart it. The very first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,
on which our system was initially modeled, began with the words,
"[a]n act for the encouragement of learning. "263 Our nation's
Founders similarly thought that protecting copyrights would
enhance education. The constitutional provision giving Congress
the power to pass copyright laws264 is the only time in which the
framers connected a congressional power to a specific purpose.265
Evidence of this belief that copyright was designed to be
consistent with the educational mission is also reflected in the first
federal copyright statute of 1790 which began, like the Statute of
Anne, with the words, "[a]n Act for the encouragement of learning
.... ."266 The stated purpose of these Acts does not support an
interpretation that the encouragement of learning would apply only
to rich institutions. Rather, if fair use is to survive as something
more accessible than a luxury retreat, we must work towards
clarity and discard old myths so those without access to copyright
counsel can reap its benefits as well.
Copyright law was designed to be the engine that would drive
the educational mission and creative thought, not limit it. The
Founders believed that protecting rights to compensation would
actually enhance free speech and public access.267 Although it is
262 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985).
263 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne. c. 19 (Eng.).
264 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 cl. 8.
265 See LESSIG, supra note 4, at 215.
266 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
267 Patterson, supra note 8, at 5 ("Copyright's basis as a proprietary concept is
that it enables one to protect his or her own creations. Its regulatory basis is that
when these creations constitute the expression of ideas presented to the public,
they become part of the stream of information whose unimpeded flow is critical
to a free society. The right to control access to one's own expressions before
publication does not engender free speech concerns, but publishers' control of
access after publication does. This explains why historically copyright was
deemed a monopoly to be strictly construed and to be shaped to serve the public
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sometimes ignored, this theme continues to resonate in current
copyright doctrine. In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 268 the Supreme
Court noted that "copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of
enriching the general public through access."269 By encouraging
creative expression through limited monopolies, the Copyright
Clause "promot[es] broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts."270 In some instances, the Supreme Court has
indicated that the public goal of cultural enrichment is more
important than the conflicting copyright purpose of providing
economic incentives for authors and publishers: "The primary
object of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.' ,271 William
Patry eloquently emphasized the need to return to this important
copyright policy, observing that "copyright debates rarely focus on
the only relevant question: Will the proposal actually serve the
public good by promoting learning?" 272
interest over that of the copyright owner. The public interest to be served was
reasonable access to the copyrighted work.").
268 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
269 Id. at 527.
270 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)) (reversing
the district court's dismissal of action claiming First Amendment violation in
removal of works from the public domain through Section 514 of the URAA, 17
U.S.C. § 104A, and sending case back to district court for further review).
271 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8).
272 WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS xviii (2009).
See also, Ruth Okediji, Givers Takers and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use
Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 127 (2001) ("If copyright's goal
is to encourage production, access, and use then it seems self-defeating to
preclude another party from engaging in creative expression based on the first
work, while also giving the first author the right to restrict access to the work.").
Okediji also points out:
The careful balance between protecting rights of 'owners' and ensuring
public benefit by facilitating access to protected works has been the
framework within which the constitutional imperative to 'promote the
progress of science and the useful arts' has historically been pursued.
The irony imposed upon this assiduously crafted system of copyright
protection is that the artificial constructs of real space, such as
'authorship' and 'copy,' which lie at the heart of copyright, must now
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In assessing the interplay of the four fair use factors in the
context of scholarship, the preceding discussion suggests that the
first and fourth factors will generally heavily weigh in favor of a
fair use finding. While the second and third factors may tip against
such a finding in specific cases, we believe that most courts, when
confronted with academic use of content in scholarship, would find
that the use strongly promotes copyright purposes and ultimately
find the use to be fair. Our belief from reading many fair use
opinions is supported by the data collected by Barton Beebe. He
found 214 cases in which both factors one and four either favored
or disfavored fair use. "In all but one of these opinions, the
outcome of the fair use test followed the outcome of these two
factors."273 For all of these reasons, when a scholar seeks to use
copyrighted content in academic or creative writing, we believe
that a balancing of the fair use factors, when viewed in light of
copyright purposes, will generally weigh in favor of fair use.
VI. CONCLUSION
The educational community must assert and defend fair use if it
is to retain some autonomy over academic content and preserve
some equity in the delivery of its mission. Access to information
is a theme resonating within legal and philosophical constructs of
both free speech and equal protection in a society that considers
itself just. In a world where technology makes so much content
available for educational use, the copyright laws that were
originally conceived to promote education are instead often
routinely applied to inhibit it. Unequal access to counsel and
profound disparities in the content available on campus exacerbate
the problem.
Fair use is the primary means to restore that balance. Despite
the myths that abound, fair use jurisprudence is a dynamic, fact-
based, ever changing body of law and courts are more willing than
be deconstructed to make that same system work in cyberspace. How to
do so is the difficult task. What is not difficult, however, is that the
central objective of promoting public welfare and the normative
principles that have developed for this purpose remain unchanged.
Idat 111-12.
273 See Beebe, supra note 119, at 584.
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one might expect to find fair use when equity demands it. Whether
the issue is classroom access to research and scholarship or the
publication of a substantive scholarly critique, we think both
copyright jurisprudence and equity will often support fair use. We
have seen fair use muscles atrophy and flex and can vouch for the
fact that the latter is far more empowering to the academic mission
and far better aligned with the Founders' understanding that
copyright is intrinsically entwined with public access.
